exemplars and prototypes

[David B. Kronenfeld]

        In case it's useful, let me briefly respond to Brian MacWhinney's
helpful comments.

At 11:39 AM 10/16/98 -0600, Brian MacWhinney wrote:
>   Regarding David Kronenfeld's note on exemplars and prototypes and the
>possibility of terminological slippage, let me say that the distinction is
>fairly clear in the psychological literature.  An exemplar is a specific
>real-world instance, i.e. a particular dog or a particular candle.  A
>prototype is a merger of the best or common features of the many exemplars.

        This is helpful to me, at least.

>David is referring to the contrast in cognitive anthropology between
>featural theory and prototype theory.

        Within cognitive anthropology is where the prototype/exemplar
distinction seems not much to be made.  Some versions of prototype theory
here, coming off of Rosch's work in psychology, do make use of "prototypes"
in Brian's sense; but others (including my own "extentionist semantics"
approach) speak of "prototypes" in a sense that is much closer to Brian's
sense of "exemplars".  I have sometimes used "prototypic referent" (as
opposed to a "typical" one) as a way of describing a referent or exemplar
that is key (as opposed to some kind of average or most frequent
referent)--where I do discuss the basis behind this key role for the given
referent.  "Core" and "kernel" are also used to characterize such key referents.

>                                     This contrast also exists in
>psychology and many papers have been written arguing for one or the other,
>but no one really challenges the potential relevance of exemplars during
>the initial phases of induction.  The issue is whether the role of
>exemplars in the final system is secondary and peripheral or major and
>central.

        Yes.

>  In any case, I don't sense any terminological slippage.  Instead, I think
>there is a basic disagreement in both fields regarding (1) the relative
>importance of exemplars and (2) the decision to opt for feature theory vs.
>prototype theory.

        Yes.  All I meant was that the major focus within anthropological
discussions has been on the opposition between feature models and focal
referent models; the prototype vs. exemplar distinction within focal models
has not much been raised.

>  The range of my reading in cognitive anthropology is fairly restricted,
>so I am happy to stand corrected on this.
>
>--Brian MacWhinney
>
        Thanks for the information.  The exemplar/prototype distinction
seems quite helpful.
                                David Kronenfeld