autonomy and related issues

Edith A Moravcsik edith at CSD.UWM.EDU
Tue Dec 21 15:54:55 UTC 1999


This is in response to a number of recent postings on the concept of
the autonomy of syntax.

Talmy Givo'n argued that the difference between the functionalist and
formalist persuasions was rather large because it was one between
an adaptive, evolutionary approach to language and a non-adaptive,
anti-evolutionary approach. I think this would be the case if functional
explanations were entirely excluded in the formalist approach; but I do
not think this is so, for two reasons. First, formalists I believe do not
claim that ALL grammatical phenomena are derivable from general laws of
form; only some - or most - are. This leaves room for functional
explanations. Second, there is no reason why general laws of form posited
by formalists should not themselves be derivable from functionally-based
generalizations.  In fact, the very concept of innateness seems to me
to be a functional principle (although not well-delimited). That is to
say, if a functional explanation is one that makes reference to the goals
and means of language use - i.e., the communicative and expressive needs
of humans and the psychological and physical constraints under which these
goals are to be achieved - than innateness is a functional "explanation"
since it makes reference to psychological and physical contraints of the
language user.

The very interesting quotes that Johanna Bubba listed show that
the autonomy of syntax has indeed been considered to be a divisive issue
between formalists and functionalists. A further question, however, is
whether it has been so by necessity - or, as John Moore put it, whether
the two opposing views on this issue are "integral part/s/ of the /two/
paradigm/s/". I would think the answer is no. As I see it, a purely
formal description - that is, one without reference to meaning and
function - is actually a necessary part of any functionalist's agenda. As
Martin Haspelmath pointed out, everybody's grammar, including
functionalists', will make reference to purely formal concepts and this
is understandable: if functionalist are interested in how form relates
to meaning and function, the very question necessitates a characterization
of form all by itself - simply because we cannot talk about the
relationship between objects unless there is first a characterization of
those object constructed independently of their relationship. If this
point is correct, it would constitute an answer to Carl Mills' query
re why construct autonomous syntactic descriptions.

All in all, I am proposing two points:
   (a) A purely formal description of sentence structure is a necessary
part of functional accounts because sentence form is the entity the
relationship of which to other things functionalists are interested in.
   (b) Functional explanations for sentence form may not be necessary
parts of formalist accounts but they are possible parts of them first,
because not all syntactic phenomena may be explainable in terms of
laws about form, and, second, because laws of form may themselves be
derivable from functional considerations related to human perception and
cognition.

The notion that before we can talk about the relationship between things,
we need to characterize those things independently of each other may also
provide an answer to the question raised by Stephen Straight and also
discussed by Wolfgang Schulze - namely, why posit the very concept
of grammar to beging with? I think we need a characterization of grammar
because what we want to know things about it: how grammar is acquired, how
grammar changes (ontogenetically and historically), how it is stored, and
how it is used. If these are our questions, then we do need a
characterization of grammar that is independent of how it is acquired,
changed, and used.

In other words, both the concept of a strictly-formal account of sentence
structure and also the concept of a grammar are entitites that we
need in order for the questions that we are asking to make sense -
namely, how does form relate to meaning and function and how is grammar
acquired, stored, processed, etc.  The only way, it seems to me, not to be
obliged to construct autonomous characterizations of the notions
"syntactic form" and "grammar" would be by changing our research questions
so that they are not about the relationship of these constructs to other
things.

Is this correct?

Edith

PS I very much agree with Martin Haspelmath that the/a main difference
   between the Chomskian and the functionalist agend is one of what the
   basic question is - one about language structure or one about the
   acquisition of language.
   ************************************************************************
                         Edith A. Moravcsik
                         Department of Foreign Languages and Linguistics
                         University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
                         Milwaukee, WI 53201-0413
                         USA

                         E-mail: edith at uwm.edu
                         Telephone: (414) 229-6794 /office/
                                    (414) 332-0141 /home/
                         Fax: (414) 229-2741



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