Assumptions about Communication, etc.

[Steve Long]

In a message dated 3/7/2001 12:30:07 AM, dparvaz at UNM.EDU writes:
<< I was under the impression that agentivity depended more on the _Absicht_
variety of "intent" than on the lower-level _Intentionalitaet_ that I thought
was the topic of this thread. If I'm wrong about this, I need to re-read a
whole lot of material in a new light. >>

In my humble opinion, that may be a problem here.  Husserlian
"Intentionalitaet" is a specific, specialized and perhaps bigger issue.  But
at least one part of this tread simply dealt with the word "intention" as it
would be used in a linguistic definition of communication.   "Intent" or
"intention" in its normal meaning (not Intentionality with a capital "I") is
an understandable concept in a variety of sciences and everyday life.  And
that expected meaning would logically be valid in and of itself in discussing
these matters.  Not that the specialized meaning (as in "Intentional cause")
is not valid, but it should also be possible to invoke the plain meaning in
English (and without recourse to the fine definition that happens in German
or unique meaning found in some epistemological approaches).

How is it that the discussion of "intent" as it is used to describe examples
of communications in law or wildlife could possibly invoke a specialized and
essentially phenomenological concept to the exclusion of its ordinary
meaning, that is, simply purposeful speech or behavior?

This seems to go back to the message that started this tread, which was about
unstated assumptions.

Regards,
Steve Long