Concerning WALS

Sat Nov 8 09:01:39 UTC 2008

Dear friends,
I want to briefly come back to a point made by Matthew:

> But the theoretical questions that I'm most interested in are 
> questions of the form "What are languages like?" I'm interested in 
> theories about the range of typological variation and the limits on 
> this variation.  I'm also interested in theories about why languages 
> are the way they are, but for me those questions are more like a hobby 
> than the core of what I do as a linguist.
Possible answers to the question "What are languages like?" necessarily 
entail a number of (hidden) assumptions about the question "Why 
languages are the way they are". First, you set up a class of (say) 
'objects' delimiting from other possible 'objects' ("language"). This 
classification thus includes a definition of the class at issue. For 
instance, you may say that 'language' is the structural coupling of 
patterns of motoric activities related to 'breath obstruction' 
(articulation) and conceptual patterns. Or, you may say that this 
coupling may likewise involve motoric patterns related to mimics, 
gesture etc. (thus including e.g. sign languages). The overall quality 
of the definiendum thus depends from which position you take (or: which 
definiens you select). Accordingly, the choice of the definiens 
automatically addresses questions about the ontology of the definiendum. 
Which position so ever you take: The choice would (in science) reflect a 
theoretical segment that is, however, less often spoken out in fuller 
details. In other words: Matthew's 'hobby' is fundamental for answering 
his original question. The same holds for 'variation': In order to 
'observe' variations within a class set up by definition (!), you have 
to select deviating features. Yet, the act of observing differences 
depends from the point of view of the observer: For instance, if you 
start from the class of 'cars' (defined how so ever), you have multiple 
choices concerning the selection of features: The cars themselves do not 
tell the observer, which features are different, but it is the observer 
who decides (types of wheels, number of wheels, color, shape of the 
autobody, carriage, functions etc.). Moreover, it is the observer who 
sets up 'theories' about which features are comparable even though they 
may have different shapes. Who tells the observer that for instance (in 
linguistics) the Turkish inferential -mIS can be included into a class 
of variation that is also present with the (say) German modal pattern 
'er soll + Perfect' (Turkic gitmiS ~ German 'er soll gegangen sein')? 
The choice of the tertium comparationis presupposes that we first decide 
(!) on the comparability of the items in question. And again, this 
decision is grounded in theory (be it pronounced or not). Note that in 
my sense, 'theory' does not necessarily mean a full fledged 
construction. Here, 'theory' refers to any schematic pattern that 
because active in a (scientific) cognition when perceiving/observing 
linguistic 'worlds'.   

I'm left with the impression that the present debate brings us back to 
discussions that went on 30-40 years ago: The (Phoney) Linguistic War 
between East Coast and West Coast Linguistics conditioned that quite a 
number of linguists turned away and practiced what has been called 
'business-as-usual linguistics'. This scientific behavior seems to be a 
general tendency in case theory-driven debates exclude people not 
willing to enter one of the camps (a teacher of mine once had 
polemically termed this pattern 'Scientific Biedermeier'). Still, I am 
not sure whether this 'drawback' (to business-as-usual linguistics) can 
be more than just a 'pause' in the debate on what Matthew has addressed 
in the question "Why languages are the way they are?". I think that, 
today, it is crucial to openly articulate one's own position with 
respect to this question that underlies - as I have said above - the 
question "What are languages like?". Even a 'hunter and gatherer' of 
linguistic data must have an idea about what is the 'use' of collecting 
these data and according to which 'recipe' (s)he collects them. Here, 
the three standard paradigms ('something is the way it has become' 
(causa efficiens; 'mythology'), 'something is the way it is' (causa 
formalis; 'descriptivism'), and 'something is for what is has been 
designed' (causa finalis; 'utopy')) cannot be separated except for 
short-living heuristic purposes. The global scientific paradigm usually 
focuses upon one of these positions (today, the causa efficiens being 
the main target of ontology, contrary to say 30 years ago, when the 
causa finalis played the major role). However, we cannot (or: must not) 
escape from the others.....

Best wishes,
Wolfgang  

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*Prof. Dr. Wolfgang 
Schulze                                                                   
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