Canada: the role of the media in the October Crisis

Harold F. Schiffman haroldfs at ccat.sas.upenn.edu
Sat Mar 10 22:40:25 UTC 2007


Laukev7's Essays

Friday, March 09, 2007

The role of the media in the October Crisis

The October Crisis was an event that forever marked Quebec society and its
relationship to the Canadian government, and contributed to the
nationalist mobilisation of Quebec society. It was an event where the
media played a crucial role, both because it would not, as far as the
public was concerned, have been an event without its coverage, and because
it made palpable goods out of abstract concepts like civil liberties,
public safety and democracy. The temporary absence of those goods became a
visible threat that could be watched by the average citizen, even if they
were not personally affected. This essay will show, by examining newspaper
clippings from the time of the crisis, how the media played a role in
shaping the October Crisis before, during and after the events. To this
end, a historical background, along with its controversies, will be given,
followed by an analysis of media coverage of the root causes and solutions
for the crisis, its stance towards the War Measures Act, its dramatisation
of the events, and a brief comparison with the coverage of the crisis by
the foreign press.


The main actor that was responsible for the October Crisis was the FLQ
(Front de Libration du Quebec), a terrorist group founded in the early
1960s which sought the secession of Quebec from the Canadian
confederation. The FLQ conducted a series of illegal operations throughout
the decade, such as bank hold ups and planting bombs in mailboxes (Levin
and Sylvester, 71). The FLQ was mostly ignored and treated like an
ordinary criminal group, until October 5, 1970, when they kidnapped
British trade commissioner James Cross. Threatening the execution of their
hostage, they made demands that included a ransom of $500,000 in gold
bars, the liberation of 23 FLQ prisoners, an aircraft to send them to Cuba
or Algeria and the broadcast of their manifesto in print and electronic
media. Only the last of those demands was granted, in response to which
the FLQ decided to kidnap a second hostage, Vice Prime Minister and Labour
Minister Pierre Laporte, instead of executing James Cross. Following
failure of negotiations between the provincial Bourassa government and the
FLQ, Bourassa requested army personnel to be dispatched in the province.
On October 16, the Canadian federal government, led by Prime Minister
Pierre Elliott Trudeau, proclaimed the War Measures Act, which suspended
civil rights and allowed arbitrary detention. On October 17, the execution
of Pierre Laporte was announced by the FLQ. Police searches and arrests
without warrant went rampant as the authorities attempted to find James
Cross, until seven weeks later they received a letter from him confirming
that he was still alive. Eventually, the police found the building where
Cross was detained, prompting the kidnappers to renew negotiations. The
crisis ended when James Cross was released on December 3rd and the
kidnappers were granted safe passage to Cuba (Levin and Sylvester, 1-8).

However, this version of the events is not without controversy. In his
book The assassination of Pierre Laporte, Pierre Vallires, a member of the
Parti Quebecois famous for his dramatic departure from the FLQ and his
repudiation of its violent methods, expressed doubts over the
circumstances surrounding the death of Pierre Laporte, believing that it
may have been an accident rather than an execution, and questioned the
motives of the federal government in implementing the War Measures Act. He
pointed out that Pierre Trudeau, in 1964, well before the founding of the
PQ and only shortly after the activities of the FLQ started, had already
identified the Quebec sovereignty movement as a threat to democracy and
freedom, which Vallires believed to be inseparable from 'Canadian Unity'
in Trudeau's mind (23).

Vallires was encouraged to write his book by Jacques Ferron, after having
initially rejected his accusations formulated in his Historiettes
published in the newspaper Le Canada Francais. Ferron speculated that there
was police infiltration of the FLQ, and that the October Crisis was
manufactured or deliberately allowed to happen by the federal authorities
to discredit the Quebec sovereignty movement and intimidate its
supporters. The perspective of Ferron and Vallires was endorsed by
historian Georges Langlois in his book Octobre en question, published in
1990 (O Gormaile, 12-17).

The documentary La guerre secrete contre l'independance du Quebec also cited
some of the facts exposed by Vallires, revealing that an effort to fight
Quebec separatism predated the October Crisis. Richard Cleroux estimated
that the secret war was launched in December 1969, during a meeting of
ministers attended by Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Those efforts
were boosted by the gain of 23% of the votes of the Quebec electorate in
the first election contested by the Parti Quebecois in the spring of 1970.
Shortly after the election, measures were taken to reinforce the RCMP
(Royal Canadian Mounted Police) and the army to respond in the eventuality
of the application of the War Measures Act. A special division in the RCMP
called Section G was created specifically to deal with separatism, in
particular the FLQ which was considered a threat the time (Deschenes and
Gabriele).

Allegations of malicious intent have been consistently denied by Trudeau
and the members of the federal government who participated in the crisis,
who have maintained that they acted in the interest of public safety in
response to what was perceived as a threat to democratic institutions
(Leroux, 117). Vallires' suspicions that Laporte's death was accidental,
as well as FLQ actions being the result of police infiltration, have been
denied by FLQ members Paul Rose and Francis Simard, who contend that the
FLQ bore responsibility for his death and acted on their own accord.
However, Rose had previously claimed innocence to the death of Laporte
(116).

Regardless, it remains undisputed today that there were RCMP attempts
until 1975 to artificially extend the October Crisis in order to discredit
the Quebec sovereignty movement. The documentary further revealed that
RCMP Carole Devault had infiltrated the FLQ during the October Crisis, and
after the crisis created fake FLQ cells. Manipulation included planting
fake manifestos written by the head of the RCMP and bombs planted by a
suspect who was injured by his own bomb, later caught at the hospital and
revealed to be an RCMP agent. During the RCMP operations, the Parti
Quebecois attempted to dissociate itself from what were thought to be the
terrorist actions of the FLQ, which also prompted Pierre Vallires to
resign and join the PQ. Those events led to the MacDonald and Keable
inquiries, which however, remained incomplete, as the RCMP refused to make
public key classified documents (Deschenes and Gabriele).

Several social factors need to be understood in order to properly grasp
the historical background of the crisis. Editor-in-chief of Point de Mire
and ardent sovereignty proponent Pierre Bourgault identified several of
them, namely the primacy of the English language in a province with a
French-speaking majority, elections which he qualified as "truquees" (18),
assimilation of immigrants to the anglophones instead of the
French-speaking majority, and a slew of economic problems, such as
pervasive foreign ownership of capital and control of the justice system
by the rich. (18-19). Many of those grievances were found in the FLQ
Manifesto, which lamented the mistreatment of workers, the repression of
labour unions, and the control of society by the Anglo-Saxon elite (FLQ,
91-96).

The media was instrumental during and after the October Crisis in shaping
public understanding of the events, and before it as a catalysing factor.
The media reported statements made by contemporary politicians during the
crisis which identified some of the economic root causes of the rise of
the FLQ. Highlighting the economic disparity between Quebec and the rest
of Canada, Senator Mrs. Therese Casgrain described Quebecers as citoyens de
seconde classe, and comprend le sentiment tragique qui regne dans le coeur
du peuple quebecois. The senator noted the role of the media as a catalyst
for the crisis, how it changed the attitudes and ideals of younger
generations compared to older ones, and made them envious as they saw rich
houses and clothes whilst living in lower life conditions. (Mme Casgrain).
Earlier, Castonguay had given deeper insight into the social tensions
resulting from the gap between the higher and lower classes, drawing a
comparison with the United States, which he said had poverty areas which
would be unacceptable in Canada (Castonguay). Such populations, he argued,
being disempowered, in addition to be exposed to glorification of violence
on television, would be more open to violence as a political solution. He
further cites as root causes the sudden change from a socially
conservative society to an open liberal society with advanced technology,
as well as the vulnerability of Quebec culture towards North American
culture and the lack of power of its community to make it evolve.

Quebec Federation of Labour leader Louis Laberge suggested social reforms
as a remedy to the root causes of the initial support for terrorism, which
would have included constitutional reforms, justice system reforms and
social programs such as subsidised housing and minimum wage (Winter). On
December 15, 1970, The Gazette released the QFL's Emergency Program, whose
demands, in addition to those in the previous article, included that
French becomes truly the normal and every day language of work at all
levels of economic activity (Laberge).

However, there was selective reporting in the press of the root causes of
the October Crisis, most markedly in the anglophone press. While The
Gazette consistently emphasised poverty as a root cause for the FLQ
crisis, it paid little attention to other issues mentioned in the FLQ
manifesto. Conspicuously underreported by The Gazette articles was the
disaffectation of the voters towards an election system viewed as
unrepresentative and undemocratic. In the 1970 election, the Liberal Party
won 70% of the seats, despite having been rejected by 55% of the voters,
and the Parti Quebecois, despite having had 24% of the votes, only had 6% of
the seats (Bourgault, 17). This problem was only covered in a small
paragraph, as part of The Gazette's publication of the QFL's Emergency
Program (Laberge).

By contrast, an editorial by Paul Sauriol in Le Devoir entitled Pour
instaurer une vraie democratie dans notre vie, taking a large part of a
page, was dedicated to CSN president Marcel Pepin, who outlined the
problems with the voting system and proposed several radical changes,
including an electoral ID card and a permanent list of registered voters.

In all fairness, The Gazette did give significant coverage of the language
issue in Quebec, and
carried an editorial that extensively acknowledged the linguistic
injustices and the disadvantages suffered by unilingual people at work and
in the marketplace. However, there were few attempts to link the
frustration resulting from the dominance of the English language with the
rise of the FLQ, other than citing Bourassa's statement that the main
source of resentment is that French Quebecers feel they cannot work in
their own language (Premier).

The Gazette was notable for its support of the authorities and the
security measures taken by the federal and provincial governments during
the crisis. The Gazette carried a large number of articles that defended
the repressive measures, such as Society's right to protect itself and The
facts speak for the government, the latter stating that critics must be
countered by spell[ing] out the extent of the danger to Quebec society.
Another article from The Gazette entitled Dangerous but necessary defended
the newly-passed Public Order Act, arguing that while it is a 'dangerous
law', it was justifiable in 'dangerous times'.

The Gazette, however, was not alone in calling the public to support the
authorities. A particularly egregious article was carried by La Presse,
entitled Appel aux Quebecois, saying that no society is possible without
some form of authority, that chaque citoyen doit etre sans reticence avec le
gouvernement, car le gouvernement, c'est nous tous, and compared civil
libertarians with sex-obsessed people, exhorting people not to listen to
intellectuals qui discutent du sexe de la liberte [sic] et qui excitent les
enfants.(Desbiens) The Montreal Star also carried an article called High
Price for Freedom, which stated that there is no moral or ethical
difficulty at all in defending the federal action (Wilson).

By contrast, Le Devoir was far more concerned with civil liberties, and
suspicious of the use of the War Measures Act and other extraordinary
measures by the government. The Public Order Act, referred to as La Loi
Turner, was condemned in an article whose title translates as A law that
reveals not the strength but the weakness of power. Its stance towards
civil liberties sharply contrasted with that of The Gazette, as shown by
its statement that aucun gouvernement n'a le droit d'adopter une politique
qui aille au-dela de ce que la situation du moment exige raisonablement
(Justinien). An editorial by Claude Ryan argued that not only
intellectuals, but also ordinary people were questioning the measures used
by the authorities during the crisis (Ryan, Les milieux intellectuels
sont-ils les seuls a  se poser des questions?). Le Devoir also carried an
article from Canadian Press which reported that the opposition was
demanding proof that there was a threat of insurrection (La menace
d'insurrection).

Furthermore, its publication of a speech by late Canadian Prime Minister
Wilfrid Laurier under the title Toute rebellion n'est pas un crime, which
referred to the Low Canada rebellions of 1837-38, suggests that Le Devoir
had a certain degree of sympathy towards the FLQ (Laurier). Another
article, from Canadian Press, cited history professor Donald Creighton,
who considered the actions of the FLQ as la conclusion logique of the need
discovered by their ancestors to s'affranchir de la confederation canadienne
(Le crime du FLQ). However, this is contradicted by Claude Ryan's
editorial La fin d'un long cauchemar, where he decried l'inanite de la
violence comme moyen d'action politique dans une societe comme la notre, and
called the actions of the FLQ tragiquement irresponsables (Ryan). His
statement that the principle of the superiority of a negotiated solution
over resorting outright to brute force suggests that the stance taken by
Le Devoir was not partisan to the FLQ, but rather pleaded for a peaceful
solution, while condemning the excesses of the government in dealing with
the crisis (Ryan, La fin d'un long cauchemar).

Occasionally, even the Gazette expressed mild disapproval of police abuse;
however, the condemnations were made less because of loss of civil
liberties as out of concern that they would result in reduced popular
support for the authorities. Such an example could be seen in the article
Arrests under War Act alienates academic community; on one hand it notes
that the massive arrests on the campuses alienated the intellectuals;
however later noted that those raids hurt the government's popularity even
more (Cleroux).

Overall, despite the support by 88.3% of the Quebec population for the
measures taken by the federal government, there was alarm over their
impact on freedom of information (86.6 p.c des Canadiens). This was
especially a concern for the media as shown by the article in La Presse La
liberte de l'information est en danger, which was given a large headline
(Robitaille). Point de Mire also made a point of mentioning that several
of their journalists were arrested in their attempts to gather information
(La Direction). However, Marc Chatelle, deputy editor-in-chief of Point de
Mire, argued that the threat to freedom of information was often used as a
pretext for the use of sensationalism to increase ratings. Sous le couvert
du juste droit, de la democratie en danger, chacun y va de ses petites
rancoeurs (46), reported Chatelle, as radio stations CKVI and CJMS
struggled to recover their audiences from CKAC and CKLM, who became les
porte-parole des ravisseurs (46). An escalation took place between the
radio stations to compete for ratings where every tactic was permissible,
including allowing open commentary from the audience and outright making
up news in extreme cases (Chatelle, 46-47).

As in the radio, sensationalism manifested itself, with few exceptions, in
the printed press regardless of targeted readers. On October 18, The
Journal de Montreal carried the headlines Le cadavre de Pierre Laporte
retrouve in large characters that spread across almost the entirety of the
front page. On the front page of the October 16, 1970 issue of The
Gazette, a large headline read Free only five says Bourassa; but FLQ's
lawyer screams no!. The October 19, 1970 issue of the McGill Daily carried
a headline that read Parliament Hill tense after Laporte death. The Sunday
Express of October 18, 1970, carried the large, bolded words Laporte
Killed in a headline that took the half top of the page, with a photo
underneath of the car where his body was found. Even in Le Devoir,
coverage of the October Crisis was not always exempt from sensationalistic
details: on the front page of the October 20, 1970 issue, a large headline
went in details describing the funeral of Pierre Laporte as sans apparat,
beneath a smaller headline that specified  la requete meme de Mme Pierre
Laporte.

As paradoxical as it may seem, Lysiane Gagnon argued that despite the
sensationalism, the abundance of information prevented panic from
overcoming the Quebec population. While she conceded that it was not
always easy to determine the factual basis of the reports, she pointed out
that retractions were quickly forthcoming, and that the spread of rumour
increased exponentially following the self-censorship of radio stations
when the War Measures Act was enforced. (Chatelle, 47)

Gagnon's theory on the role of the media was corroborated by Chatelle's
analysis of the importance of the radio during the October Crisis. As
reported in Le Devoir, the French-speaking Quebecois relied more on
television and radio than their anglophone counterparts, who mainly
gathered their news from newspapers. However, during the October Crisis,
radio overtook both television and the printed press, as it required fewer
and cheaper equipment, allowing journalists to report developments on the
spot and quickly correct them, which was even less feasible for the print
press. Marc Chatelle concluded that the media creates the events (47). Il
aurait suffi, he stated, que la radio, la television, et les journaux
ignorent l'affaire et le FLQ ne serait pas une realite aussi criante (47).

Chatelle's analysis of the role of the media had proponents both in the
camp of the supporters and the opponents of the application of the War
Measures Act. Vallires himself had questions over manipulation of the
media during the October crisis. In his book, he asked whether
foreknowledge of FLQ plans to kidnap Pierre Laporte led to the management
of certain Montreal radio stations being tipped off to prepare a media
campaign to play up the events for the public (52). He also implied that
the sensationalism, overdramatisation, public agitation and eventually
collective fear (52) was of benefit for the authorities to escalate the
October crisis, and cast suspicion over the telephone conversations
between Gerard Pelletier, then head of the CBC, and the heads of public and
private media like CTV and Canadian Press. (52)

At least Vallires' assertions that the media overplayed the crisis can be
verified by looking at some editorials written during the time of the
crisis. The article Coincidence in Conspiracy of the November 20 issue of
The Gazette compared the FLQ to Algerian resistance group OAS, implying
ties between the groups based on reports that FLQ members had gone to
Algeria, and that some members of the FLQ were from Algeria. The article
stated that the FLQ is estimated to have about a hundred active
terrorists, backed by supporting units that may have between 2,000 and
3,000 participants (Blakely). Later reports, however, revised the numbers
downwards to 35 members, including 20 active members. Of the 497 arrests
made under the War Measures Act, only 62 were charged ( Gormaile, 16). An
article from La Presse claimed that the FLQ were inspired by a terrorist
group called the tupamaros in Uruguay; comparing the kidnappings of
politicians and the execution of Pierre Laporte to methods used by South
American guerillas. The article, however, reported that Palestinian groups
denied rumours that members of the FLQ had been trained in fedayin camps
(Beauregard).

The authority figures who dealt with the crisis had a different
interpretation of the media sensationalism. From Pierre Trudeau's
perspective, it was the FLQ that manipulated the media, using
French-speaking media such as CKLM and Journal de Montreal as mouthpieces,
a role even admitted by former FLQ member Robert Comeau. Facing
accusations of exerting pressure over the media, former Quebec minister of
Justice Jerome Choquette responded that he simply wanted to warn the
journalists not to play the game of the FLQ (Leroux, 101; 115-118). Even
the state-owned media, was not spared criticism. Federal Members of
Parliament accused Radio-Canada of being une tribune des revolutionnaires,
separatistes et anarchistes (De nombreux deputes). Vallire pointed out,
however, that the police showed a remarkable tolerance towards the
exploitation of the FLQ activities by the media, which ended abruptly on
October 17, 1970. On the authorities' claims that the purpose was to stop
the spread of rumours, Vallires had noted that during the night of the
same day, the CBC had regardless falsely reported the death of James Cross
(53).

In the foreign press, the October Crisis received significant coverage in
a wide range of countries. The October 19, 1970 issue of Time Magazine had
an FLQ message printed over the front page, with a black and white picture
of Pierre Laporte in the background, and gave six pages of coverage to the
October Crisis. An article about negociations for the release of James
Cross was featured on the front page of the New York Times issue of the
same day (Cowen). Point de Mire dedicated two pages of its November 1st
1970 issue to front page articles from foreign newspapers, including
Nouvel Observateur, The Economist, L'Express, Time and Paris-Match (Ce
qu'en pensent les autres).

As opposed to the sensationalism of the Quebec press, he French press was
notable for its extensive, yet neutral coverage of the October Crisis. An
editorial by Marcel Adam in La Presse reported that [L]a crise politique
qui sevit au Canada domine l'actualite , ces jours-ci, en France. Adam wrote
that Le Monde a toujours rendu compte de l'evolution de la situation depuis
l'enlevement de Mr. Cross, mais sans jamais formuler de commentaires.
Nonetheless, the French media treated the October Crisis as a dramatic
political crisis, describing it with terms such as psychose and panique
(Adam).

The importance of the role of the media during the October Crisis cannot
be stressed enough. Although the sensationalism might arguably have
resulted in undeserved support to the political authorities, the
alternative of absence of information would likely have resulted in chaos.
The media played up the crisis, both to give a justification for
repression of the sovereigntist movement, and by giving national
importance to a small group that would otherwise have been regarded as a
criminal group unworthy of attention. Coverage of the root causes and
solutions to the crisis, as well as their attempts to persuade people to
side with or against the security measures, were essential in determining
the support of people for the government and their votes in the next
election. At the same time, the crisis itself influenced the media,
resulting in the traditional media being overtaken by the radio.

Today, the October Crisis is a relevant case study, as it parallels a more
recent event, the 9/11 attacks. In both events, there has been controversy
surrounding the security measures taken in the aftermath of the events,
both supporting them and criticising them for undermining civil liberties
There has also been suspicion, in many cases supported by evidence, of
government infiltration, deliberate prevarication, direct involvement, or
manipulation of public fears to further a governmental agenda. Despite the
current media taboos surrounding opinions questioning the official 9/11
story, it is important that they receive serious examination like the ones
that surrounded the October Crisis.



Works Cited

86.6 p.c. Des Canadiens appuyent la proclamation des mesures de guerre. La
Presse 17 Nov 1970: B14.
Adam, Marcel. L'acceleration des evenements au Quebec domine l'actualite
francaise. La Presse 17 Oct 1970: XX.
Beauregard, Fernand. Le FLQ se serait inspire des exploits des Tupamaros en
Uruguay. La Presse 19 Oct 1970: A13.
Blakely, Arthur. Urban guerilla methods of the FLQ mimic tactics of
Algerian French right. The Gazette 20 Oct 1970: XX.
Bourgault, Pierre. Ni heros ni martyr. Point de Mire Nov 1970: 14-19.
Canadian press La menace d'insurrection: l'opposition reclame les preuves.
Le Devoir 22 Oct 1970: 2.
--. De nombreux deputes federaux blament Radio-Canada d'etre une tribune des
revolutionnaires, separatistes et anarchistes. La Presse 19 Oct 1970: C14.
--. Le crime du FLQ aura ete de tirer la conclusion logique de
l'enseignement recu (Donald Creighton). Le Devoir 4 Dec 1970: 4.
--. Mme Casgrain: Les Quebecois sont des citoyens de seconde classe. Le
Devoir 4 Dec 1970.
Castonguay, Claude. Quebec must get to the root of crisis says Castonguay.
The Gazette 20 Nov 1970: 9
Chatelle, Marc. L'abondance d'information a empeche la panique. Point de
Mire Nov 1970: 46-47.
Cleroux, Richard. Arrests under War Act alienates academic community. The
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Cowan, Edward. Quebec gets note from 2D hostage, renews its offer. The New
York Times 19 Oct 1970: C1.
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Laurier, Wilfrid. Toute rebellion n'est pas un crime. Le Devoir 20 Nov
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editeur, 2002.
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--. La fin d'un long cauchemar. Le Devoir 4 Dec 1970: 4.
Sauriol, Paul. Pour instaurer une vraie democratie dans notre vie
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posted by Laukev7 at 2:45 PM

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