Uyghurs in Xinjiang: Causes of resistance and perspectives for future unrest

Wed Aug 6 21:56:24 UTC 2008

Uyghurs in Xinjiang: Causes of resistance and perspectives for future unrest

Henriette Kristensen
MA Student, Institute of Political Science, Aarhus university
(henriettemeldgaard at hotmail.com)

.July 19 2008
.

Since the beginning of the 1990s China's far northwestern province,
Xinjiang, large riots and unrest staged by the largest Muslim minority
in the province, the Uyghurs, to protest against Chinese rule have
gained increased attention. In 1997 the unrest even spread to the
capital Beijing, where a bus explosion staged by Uyghurs killed two
and injured at least a handful people, and now less than a week before
the Olympics the police in Kashgar, a historical centre of Uyghur
resistance in Xinjiang, has reportedly been attacked. Following 9/11
China started to refer to the Uyghurs as "terrorists" - and with the
Olympics approaching, Beijing has identified "separatists" pushing for
independence of Xinjiang as a main threat to the Games[HK1] . The
question is however why the Uyghurs in Xinjiang are opposing Chinese
rule, and how likely it is that they in the future will take actions
to express their dissatisfaction?

1) Causes of resistance: Cultural, economic and political marginalization

The Uyghurs today account for almost half of Xinjiang's population.
Despite of this, the Han Chinese tightly controls Xinjiang, and the
Uyghurs are culturally, economically and politically marginalized.
This seems to be the primary sources of the Uyghur's dissatisfaction
with Chinese rule.

The Chinese authorities have taken repressive measures against Uyghur
culture in Xinjiang, and most importantly the Uyghur's religious
traditions and language is being repressed. The Uyghurs are Sunni
Muslims and they have strong traditions for the mystical branch of
Islam, Sufism. Generally, the Uyghurs do not adhere to a strict
interpretation of Islam, but since the 1980s Xinjang has experienced
an Islamic revival. This revival has collided with an intensified
crackdown from the Chinese authorities on Muslims in Xinjiang, as they
have strengthened official control over the Islamic clergy (for
example through training and reeducation campaigns), enforced
registration of religious institutions, closed down mosques, banned
certain religious practices and arrested religious leaders accused of
being "unpatriotic" and "subversive"[HK2] . A vital part of this
crackdown has been the "Strike Hard" campaign (yanda) launched
nation-wide from 1996, and in Xinjiang directed against "the three
forces" (separatists, terrorists, and religious extremists). To co-opt
religion in Xinjiang Beijing has promoted a state-controlled version
of Islam in the province, e.g. by requiring that the Islamic clergy in
major mosques are state-employees and controlling Islamic education.
Linguistically the Uyghurs also differ significantly from the Han
Chinese, as the Uyghur language belongs to the Turkic family and is
closely related to Uzbek. At first glance Beijing takes a conciliatory
stance towards the Uyghur language - for example it is adopted as an
official language in Xinjiang, and publication of nationality books,
nationality broadcasting etc. is supported by law[HK3] . In reality
however, the Chinese authorities have strived to promote Mandarin
(Putonghua). A clear example of this is the education system, where
universities in Xinjiang since 2002 have been required to teach all
courses except language and culture classes exclusively in Putonghua.
In 2004 measures were taken to introduce similar polices in elementary
and middle schools[HK4] . Beijing has also through frequent language
reforms impacted sentiments of a common Turkic identity among the
Uyghurs. On the one hand, the revival of an Arabic-based script in
Xinjiang in the 1980s strengthened feelings of a common Uyghur
identity. On the other hand, the frequent language reforms have
introduced divisions between different generations of Uyghurs, and
linguistically alienated the Uyghurs from the Central Asian states,
where following independence a Latin-based script has generally
replaced the modified Cyrillic alphabet[HK5] .

The Uyghurs are also economically marginalized. Traditionally,
Xinjiang has been one of the least developed regions in China, but
since the 1990s massive investments have been channeled into the
province - a trend that accelerated in 2000 when the campaign to "Open
Up the West" (xibu da kaifa) was launched. The investments have
however, mainly benefited the Han population in Xinjiang, not the
Uyghurs, as the investment strategy has focused on exploiting
Xinjiang's large reserves of natural- and mineral resources, promoting
Xinjiang as a key producer of cotton and improving the region's poor
transportation network. This economic strategy has not only resulted
in an influx of Han Chinese into Xinjiang (in 1949 approximately 6% of
Xinjiang's population was Han Chinese, today the number is around
40%[HK6] ),  but has also proved disadvantageous for the Uyghurs.
Firstly, economic disparities between Han Chinese and Uyghurs in
Xinjiang are significant, as Han Chinese populate the urbanized
relatively well-off northern Xinjiang, whereas the rural southern
Xinjiang where most of the Uyghurs live is impoverished. One
explanation for this is that investments are primarily allocated to
e.g. the oil and gas industry owned by Han Chinese and mainly
employing Han Chinese. Secondly, the Uyghurs feel "exploited" by
Beijing, as the state gets most of the revenues from Xinjiang's vast
energy reserves, and its oil and gas is consumed by China's coastal
cities. Thirdly, Beijing has a tight control of Xinjiang's economy
through e.g. the energy sector and the Xinjiang Production and
Construction Corps (XPCC) - a Han structure formally established in
1954 to absorb demobilized members of Guomindang and People's
Liberation Army (PLA). Today many Han Chinese in the province are
members of XPCC, and the institution - which is directly under control
of the State Council - has substantial influence over Xinjiang's
economy.

Finally, the Ughurs are politically marginalized. Beijing has given
preferences to minorities when filling state leadership positions. The
Uyghurs in these positions - for example the chairman of Xinjiang
Ismail Tiliwaldi and his predecessor Abdul Abdulrixit - are however
often trained in Han Chinese institutions. In addition, the real power
center in Chinese politics - the Chinese Communist Party - has not
introduced preferential policies for minorities, and even though the
situation has improved, Uyghurs are still underrepresented in cadre
ranks[HK7] .

2) How likely is it that Uyghurs will take actions against Chinese
rule in the future?

Turning to the question of perspectives for future unrest staged by
Uyghurs, it is clear that tensions in Xinjiang are deep-rooted. The
Chinese leadership has taken steps to address grievances experienced
by Uyghurs by introducing economic reforms, affirmative action
programs etc., but the results have been mixed - and in some respect
polices such as the Campaign to Open Up the West and the Strike Hard
Campaign have actually exacerbated - not alleviated - the Uyghur's
grievances. Another factor encouraging protests among Uyghurs is that
they have a historical tradition for resisting Chinese rule - China
did not get genuine control over Xinjiang until the 18th century, and
the Uyghurs established short-lived independent rules in the 1860s and
again twice in the 1930s and 1940s. A third factor facilitating
collective action by Uyghurs is Islam. Even though the Uyghurs do not
adhere to a strict interpretation of Islam, Islam plays a unifying
role for the Uyghurs, and Sufism which has strong roots in Xinjiang
seems to be particularly well-suited for underground Islam. Finally,
external events have inspired the Uyghurs to resist Chinese rule.
Especially the break-up of the USSR was important, as the Uyghurs were
suddenly the only major Turkic nationality without its own state with
the new-found independence of the Turkic states in Central Asia[HK8] .
Also, Islamic movements with whom the Uyghurs have close historical,
cultural and linguistic ties have emerged in Central Asia (for example
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), serving as a source of inspiration
for the Uyghurs and potentially providing support to them.

At the same time however, a number of factors significantly impede the
Uyghur's capacity to oppose Chinese rule. First and foremost, the
Uyghurs have historically never been united - instead of identifying
as Uyghurs, they have traditionally identified with the oasis town
from which their family traces its origin[HK9] . In addition, Islam's
role as a unifying vehicle for Uyghur resistance is hampered by the
fact that the Uyghurs traditionally adhered to a relative moderate
version of Islam. This also puts into question the extent to which the
Uyghurs identify with other Islamic movements in the region. Finally,
even though China's policy in Xinjiang has produced mixed results, it
has in some respects reduced the capacity for Uyghur resistance - for
example, the economic policy has eroded social ties among the Uyghurs,
and pan-Turkism has been reduced by language reforms.

Assessing the likelihood of Uyghur resistance against the Chinese
authorities in the future is thus complex. Tensions in Xinjiang are
indeed deep-rooted, and actions by Uyghurs directed against Chinese
rule can be expected to continue in the years to come. However,
disunity is a historical problem among the Uyghurs, and even though
their protests pose challenges to the Chinese leadership it does not
put the future rule of the Chinese Communist Party into question.