[lg policy] Jaffna and the North of Sri Lanka today: Post war realities, challenges and opportunities

[Harold Schiffman]

Jaffna and the North of Sri Lanka today: Post war realities,
challenges and opportunities

November 10, 2010 at 12:04 pm ·  by Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe

[Editors note: Also  see interview with Dr. Muttukrishna Sarvananthan
here, along with one other from a leading rights activist in Jaffna.
>>From the psycho-social trauma and destruction of the social fabric in
Jaffna after close upon three decades of brutal war to the challenges
of post-war development, entrepreneurship and economic revival, these
two interviews focus on two leading Tamil civil society activists who
have lived in Jaffna from when the war was still raging.]

Dr. Muttukrishna Sarvanathan is the principal researcher at the Point
Pedro Institute, which is a non-for-profit think tank that provides
analysis and advocacy on political and economic issues afflicting the
Sri Lankan Tamil population in the north.

In an exclusive interview conducted in mid-October Dr. Sarvanathan
speaks to Sergei De Silva-Ranasinghe about a range of current and
contentious matters related to post-war stabilization and nation
building in Sri Lanka and how they have impacted on Sri Lanka’s
indigenous Tamil population.

1. Tell us about what has happened with regard to the implementation
of the Tamil language in the North and East of Sri Lanka since 1987,
but especially since the end of the civil war? Where has it been
implemented successfully, and where is it lacking, and why?

Though Tamil language has been made an official language (in addition
to the existing Sinhala language) in 1987, the implementation of that
provision has been weak. The implementation of the twin official
language policy remains weak even after the end of the war. Tamils
receive official communications in Sinhala language not only in the
North and East but in other parts of the country (including Colombo)
as well. Although the public administration within the North and East
by and large is conducted in Tamil language, police stations in these
areas record statements from the public in Sinhala language due to
dearth of Tamil speaking police officers.

The reason for this slow progress in implementation is lack of
bureaucratic and political will to do so; because if the government
could spend almost USD.2 billion for defence (this year’s budget
allocation) why cannot it fund the implementation of the dual language
policy. In fact, I would argue that, if the dual language usage is
fully implemented there could be significant cut in the annual defence
expenditure. Nowadays with automatic translation software it wouldn’t
be a big administrative problem to implement it. But, unfortunately,
there does not seem to be any urgency on the part of the bureaucrats
and politicians.

2. Many commentators say that since the civil war ended that the
original inter-ethnic problems that started the discord between
Sinhalese and Tamils since independence remain. Is this an accurate
reflection of reality or have some things changed?

The original inter-ethnic discords in Sri Lanka were due to language
and land rights, disenfranchisement of the hill-country Tamils in
1948, and the introduction of quota system for university admissions
in 1972. While the last two grievances have been addressed to a large
extent, the first two (language and land rights) stubbornly persist.
Besides, there are additional grievances as a direct and indirect
result of the protracted armed conflict since the early-1980s.

3. Tell us about the general situation facing Tamils in Sri Lanka
since the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009? What has been achieved in
terms of restoration of normality? What’s the general sentiment of the
civilian population towards the LTTE and to the GoSL?

A great deal of normalcy has been established gradually since the end
of the war; e.g. (i) several hitherto closed roads have been opened-up
for public use (A9 highway being the prime example), (ii) security
check points have been drastically reduced both in the North and rest
of the country, (iii) areas under high security zones have been cut
back, (iv) security restrictions on certain vocations such as fishing
have been lifted, (v) although the restriction on travel to Colombo
(and rest of the country) from Jaffna (by way of obtaining a pass from
the army) has been done away with, the registration of household
members at the local police station has been re-instituted in Colombo
since May 2010 (after the general elections).

Despite the positive trend noted above, certain negative aspects of
the LTTE-era stubbornly persist in the North (particularly in Jaffna)
with a new role-player, albeit at a much smaller scale than that of
the LTTE. The Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP), a pro-government
militia cum political party headed by a cabinet minister Mr. Douglas
Devananda, has filled the boots of the LTTE in certain illegal
activities such as extortion, kidnapping for ransom, poaching Hindu
temples, and monopolising the supply of sand for construction
purposes. The Maheshwari Nithiyam (Maheshwari Foundation – NGO arm of
the EPDP ala Tamils’ Rehabilitation Organisation of the LTTE)
monopolises the supply of sand for construction purposes within the
peninsula (one customer who asked for refund due to unexplained delay
in the supply of sand was threatened with death by the
“pulanaivuthurai” – intelligence wing – of the EPDP). Cable television
service providers in the peninsula are illegally taxed by the EPDP.

Few school children were kidnapped for ransom in the run-up to the
parliamentary elections, which were suspected to be by the EPDP but
has ceased since then. In the same way the LTTE took over the
management of several Hindu temples in the United Kingdom, Canada, and
Australia through proxies to extort the financial resources of those
temples (Kanaka Thurkkai Amman Temple in Ealing, West London, being
one such temple where Sockalingam Karunalingam was/is the proxy), the
EPDP is currently attempting to take over the management of certain
temples in the peninsula that have high revenue. My hunch is that
EPDP’s illegal tax collection amounts to about 10% of what LTTE used
to collect during the ceasefire time.

Besides, foreigners (including Sri Lankan diaspora) visiting the North
beyond Omanthai require Ministry of Defence pass, which is
antithetical to normalcy. Permissions are usually granted for air
travel only (costing LKR.18,600 or USD.175 for an adult round-trip
ticket) thereby unfairly taxing visitors to the North from abroad in
the same way the LTTE levied a special tax on diaspora people
travelling through the A9 highway during the time of ceasefire.

There is deep resentment towards the LTTE, among significant share of
the population, due to their callous disregard for human life,
recruitment of children, and the immense misery that befell the
general population during the final stages of the war. However, the
bitterness towards the LTTE unfortunately has not translated into
goodwill towards the government, partly due to pampering of terrorists
turned criminals such as Douglas Devananda, and the remnants of the
LTTE hierarchy such as Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (alias Karuna
Amman), Kumaran Pathmanathan (alias KP), Velautham Thayanithi (alias
Thaya Master), et al, by the government.

Thaya Master is apparently working as a news compiler for DAN TV
(satellite television network of the EPDP) and is building a brand new
home reportedly worth over LKR.5 Million (USD.50,000) in his native
Thambasetty village, Point Pedro. “Where did he get this money?” is
the question asked by his fellow villagers. Most likely this money is
part of the loot from Tamil civilians by the LTTE in the Vanni before
its extinction. Thaya Master’s wife, a graduate teacher, is teaching
at a nearby girls’ school called Vadamarachchi Hindu Girls’ College
and positioning herself to become the Principal not due to merit but
through the newfound political influence of her husband by aligning
with Douglas Devananda and the government.

While bulk of the IDP returnees live in squalor and some are expected
to be given LKR.500,000 at the most under the World Bank’s North East
Housing Reconstruction Project (NEHRP) or the Indian Government’s
50,000 houses project, those who were complicit in crimes against
humanity (such as recruitment of child soldiers, forcible displacement
of civilians and conscription, killing of civilians attempting to flee
the clutches of the LTTE, etc) are pampered and living in relative
luxury. “What justice is this?” is the thought lingering in the minds
of the population.

Foregoing are some of the main reasons for the civilian population’s
negative feeling towards the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL). In many
respects the journey is “continuing” rather than “beginning” (as
claimed by an EPDP election campaign poster).

4. Since fishing is a major livelihood in the Northern Province, to
what extent has the fishing community and industry revived after the
civil war? What has the government done to assist the restitution of
their livelihood? And, to what extent does the Indian Tamil fishing
community pose a problem to the livelihood of Sri Lankan fishermen in
the north by illegally fishing in Sri Lankan waters?

The government has lifted the time and distance restrictions on
fishing in most parts of the North; apart from that there is hardly
any assistance from the government. Certain coastal areas are still
classified as High Security Zone (HSZ) and thereby barred for fishing;
Mylitty to Kankesanthurai in Valikamam North, certain areas in
Vadamarachchi East, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu are still no-go areas
for fishing.

Nevertheless, the lifting of security restrictions have increased the
fish catch significantly in the Jaffna peninsula and Mannar Island
which in turn has revived the transport of fish for sale outside the
respective districts (particularly to Colombo).

Poaching by Tamilnadu fisherpersons in the northern and Gulf of Mannar
waters remains a serious threat to the livelihoods of fisherpersons in
the North. Sri Lanka Navy is reluctant to take serious action to
prevent poaching because of the political sensitivities between the
two countries. A dialogue between the fishing communities of Northern
Sri Lanka and Tamilnadu should be facilitated by both the governments
to arrest poaching. Northern fisherpersons do not have multi-day boats
or trawlers like the Indian fisherpersons to take advantage of
deep-sea fishing, which also gives a competitive advantage to the
latter.

5. There have been reports that thousands of Tamil speaking police
officers have joined the Police in the Northern and Eastern Provinces?
To what extent do Tamils in Sri Lanka have confidence in the
restitution of law and order and good governance in Sri Lanka after
the civil war?

According to my knowledge, 500-600 Tamil speaking police officers have
been recruited from the Jaffna peninsula this year and are currently
undergoing training in Kalutara Police Training College, which is
commendable. In the Eastern Province this has been going on for a
while but I do not know the number.

This does not mean that law and order situation or the governance in
general has improved in the North (read the answer to question 1 as
well) or beyond. Deteriorating law and order and poor governance have
been hallmarks of the Rajapaksha regime in the past five years
throughout the country, which continues unabated even after the end of
the war. For example, a journalist went missing in Homagama (suburb of
Colombo) few days before the Presidential election and remains
“disappeared”. One Batticaloa Municipal Council member belonging to
the Thamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) political party (a
constituent of the ruling alliance) is reported missing since
late-August 2010.

In spite of the public appeal by the Chief Minister of the Eastern
Province for his release police have not been able to trace this
person. Couple of months ago two young married ladies (resettled IDPs)
were gang raped by uniformed army personnel in Visvamadu (Mullaitivu
district). Though the local police has apprehended the culprits and
produced in court, the military police has been trying its best to get
the suspects released on bail. A high profile Deputy Minister tied a
public official to a tree for coming late for a meeting in Kelaniya in
August 2010, but no legal action has been taken against the Deputy
Minister.

The foregoing examples are hardly reassuring to the people (in the
North and beyond) as regards restoration of law and order or good
governance in the aftermath of the civil war. Should I say more?

6. As there seems to be differences of opinion among Tamils in Sri
Lanka and the diaspora, how reflective and accurate is the commentary
expressed by pro-LTTE supporters in the Tamil diaspora on the general
situation experienced by Tamils in Sri Lanka?

Some diaspora propagation about the situation back home is true, most
are exaggerations, and some are blatantly false.

A small fraction of the Tamil diaspora has been the scourge of the
Tamils in Sri Lanka. I regard this small minority of Tamil diaspora as
scum of the earth. From the early-1970s a small proportion of the
Tamil diaspora spread throughout the world (three prominent
personalities were Elayathamby Ratnasabapathy and Arular Arulpragasam
of the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS), and Anton
Balasingham of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), all of
whom were British citizens – Arulpragasam still lives in the UK and
the other two are deceased) has mislead the Tamils in the North and
East promising a mythical Tamil state; while these scoundrels lived
happily in their adopted homelands, the people of the North East Sri
Lanka had to pay enormously with their blood and sweat.

It is this tiny (but hyper active and effective) diaspora that mislead
Pirapakaran until his death by giving him false hope that the
international community through the UN (or otherwise) will rescue him
and the LTTE. The rest is history.

All along the past forty-years Tamil diaspora has been a huge
liability to the collective political interest of the Tamils in Sri
Lanka; though at individual or household level remittances from the
diaspora has hugely mitigated the impact of the civil war
(particularly in Jaffna – the most populous district out of the eight
districts in the North & East).

History teaches us that if the Tamils in Sri Lanka let the diaspora
chart its political future the Tamil community is doomed. I am
confident that the Sri Lankan Tamil community is well aware of this
fact. The goon squads in the diaspora still naively believe that
foreign countries can win them political independence in Sri Lanka and
therefore courting certain fungible politicians in their adopted
countries. Again history has taught the Tamils in Sri Lanka that
direct involvement of India and Norway on their plight has been
disastrous to their collective political interests. I do not think the
Tamils in Sri Lanka will again fall prey to the wishful thinking of
the tiny minority among the diaspora. Pirapakaran and the LTTE might
have been treacherously misled by the diaspora, but the Tamils cannot
be.

7. What do you think are the causal factors which have led to the
continued outflow of Tamils seeking asylum overseas?

Enduring human insecurities in the North, East, and beyond (some of
which were pointed out in the answers to questions 1&3) and the
absence of political resolution of the protracted ethnic conflict
could be identified as the two prime reasons for the continued outflow
of refugees from Sri Lanka to the West.

Two of the high risk categories of people who would want to flee the
country illegally or migrate lawfully are ex-combatants and supporters
/ sympathisers of the LTTE. There are media reports and anecdotal
evidence that some released ex-combatants and resettled supporters of
LTTE are re-arrested or harassed by law enforcement authorities or
pro-government militias. EPDP, for example, has recruited some
ex-combatants and LTTE supporters (Thaya Master being the most
prominent one) for whatever purpose. Some of these people join the
EPDP (or any other pro-government militia such as PLOTE or TELO) not
as a choice but as a necessity, because it would provide them security
from continued harassment by law enforcement authorities or these same
pro-government militias. Some others may decide to quit the country
either legally or illegally.

Hence, one of the preconditions to stem the outflow of refugees abroad
is for the law enforcement authorities and pro-government militias to
stop harassing ex-combatants or sympathisers.

In addition to the foregoing, a survey undertaken among youths in 2009
throughout the country (including the North and East) revealed that
about 50% of the youths wish to go abroad for good; unfortunately the
reason for this urge was not explored by the survey. Thus, right
across the country (irrespective of ethnicity) there is a craze among
Sri Lankans to migrate abroad. There appears to be a crisis of
confidence among younger generation of Sri Lankans about their
homeland.

8. Describe the relationship between the military and the Tamil
civilian population in the north? What are the negative and positive
attributes of this relationship? What has the military done to
alleviate the plight of the Tamil civilian population since the end of
the war?

The relationship between the civilian population and the armed forces
(including the police) in the North has improved tremendously since
June 2009 because security check-points have been drastically reduced
and high security zones cut back. Having said that, very young armed
forces personnel on the streets of North and East still pose a real
and perceived threat to young women; the scale of sexual violence
against women has reduced but remains high.

The negative effect of scaled-down security check-points is the
increased criminal activities of the pro-government militias (such as
EPDP, Karuna group, PLOTE, and TELO) and common criminals. In fact,
the pro-government militias are outdoing the goodwill built-up between
the armed forces personnel and the civilians. Disarmament and
disbanding of the pro-government militias is sine qua non for winning
the hearts and minds of the civilian population in the North and East.

The army is actively involved in clearing landmines and building homes
for the displaced population both in Jaffna and the Vanni, inter alia.
In the business world it is said that it could take a longtime to win
a customer, but it would take just a second to lose a customer. In the
same way, the army may do one-hundred good things for the welfare of
civilians, but one horrific incidence like the rape of women in
Visvamadu has the potential to obliterate the entire goodwill built-up
over the months/years with the civilian population. Aforementioned
business principle should be inculcated into the hearts and minds of
the armed forces personnel for posterity.

9. Describe the process of demilitarization that has taken place in
the Northern Province since the end of the civil war? What has
happened thus far?

To the best of my knowledge not much is being done towards
demilitarisation in the Northern Province, except drastic cuts in the
security check points in the Jaffna peninsula and scaling-down of high
security zones in certain areas. I do not think there has been any
reduction or increase in the number of armed forces personnel
stationed in the North. There are few instances where withdrawal of
armed forces personnel has been filled by pro-government militia/s. I
do not foresee demilitarisation to any significant extent until the
Rajapakshas are in power. Militarisation is indispensable for the
perpetuation of the Rajapaksha dynasty.

10. What has the GoSL done to develop the Northern Province since the
end of civil war? What has been planned and implemented so far? To
what extent is India financing, assisting and developing the Northern
Province?

Several roads in the North (especially in the Jaffna peninsula) are
rehabilitated or upgraded by the Road Development Authority or the
provincial administration with Asian Development Bank (ADB) loans.
Power supply is being restored in Jaffna and the Vanni.
Telecommunications expansion (both fixed line and mobile) is taking
place at fast pace. Thus, economic infrastructure development is
taking place rapidly. However, very little private investment is
taking place.

Several other development programmes are implemented under the regular
annual departmental or ministerial plans but packaged as initiatives
of the Uthuru Vasanthaya (Northern Spring) programme of the government
(three-year post-war public investment programme for the North).

India has committed a lot (>USD.800 million) for the development of
the North and East, but very little has materialised on the ground so
far. India signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for constructing
a coal power plant in Sampur or Nilaweli in the East as early as
January 2008; though almost three years has passed, construction has
not commenced yet. Moreover, India has committed to reconstruct and
upgrade the Palaly airport and the Kankesanthurai seaport in Jaffna.
India did provide building materials (asbestos sheets and cement bags)
to resettled IDPs in the Vanni early this year. It has also committed
to build 50,000 houses to resettled IDPs in Jaffna and Vanni.
Identification of beneficiaries is currently underway under a pilot
housing project in the North. Each beneficiary is likely to get
LKR.500,000 (INR.200,000) in installments but the beneficiary family
is responsible for undertaking the construction or subcontracting to a
builder. India’s involvement in post-war reconstruction in Sri Lanka
is a continuation of its post-war reconstruction initiatives in
Afghanistan and an expression of its economic might.

11. There have been unsubstantiated reports that the GoSL or the
military have built new Buddhist temples in the Northern Province and
have changed several Tamil place names to Sinhala names and sponsored
Sinhalese colonization of certain areas in the Vanni. How accurate are
these claims and can evidence be provided to support them?

Only one new Buddhist temple I have noticed along the A9 highway
somewhere between Kilinochchi and Paranthan. I have not visited the
interior Vanni yet and therefore do not know what is happening there.
However, I have noticed numerous new Buddhist statues along the A9
highway and within the Jaffna peninsula. These stand-alone Buddhist
statues are projected as Buddhist temples either due to ignorance or
willfully by vested interests. I do not think there is any official
policy of the government to build these Buddha statues by the
roadside; it is done by local army personnel on their own accord
presumably to seek divine protection from harm (around certain army
checkpoints in the North I have also noticed statues or pictures of
certain Hindu deities such as Kali and Hanuman).

However, any new religious statues/symbols/pictures in public places
should be displayed in accordance with the existing local government
(municipal and urban council and pradesha sabha) laws and with due
permission from relevant authorities. The arbitrary way in which these
religious sites in public places established by armed forces
personnel, religious dignitaries, or common citizens should not be
tolerated by law enforcement authorities. .

Buddha statues have also become the ultimate line of defense for
squatters (especially along the coast), shanty dwellers, underworld
communities, unauthorized three-wheel taxi stands, and illegal payment
hawkers, especially in and around the City of Colombo. Whenever there
is threat of eviction of the foregoing by the Urban Development
Authority or the Police, they tend to hastily erect a Buddha statue on
the hope that it would deter their eviction. Therefore, there is a
systematic abuse of Lord Buddha throughout the country (not only in
the North), which genuine Buddhists should desist.

Likewise, I noticed only one name change of a place in Jaffna
peninsula – “Kantharodai” (in Tamil) has been changed to “Kathuru
goda” (in Sinhala). This is an archaeological site near Chunnakam with
very short Buddhist dagobas like the ones found in South East Asia.
Although the name boards are changed, local people continue to refer
to the Tamil name of that area. It is analogous to the change of
street names in the Capital where since the early-1970s most English
street names are changed to local ones (mostly in memory of famous or
infamous personality), but majority of the people still refer to the
old English street names.

I have not seen any colonisation of Sinhalese in the Vanni so far; but
as I said before I have not visited the interior of Vanni yet. The
army in the Vanni is in the process of building cantonments to provide
accommodation to armed forces personnel on duty and their families,
which may be projected as colonisation. I do not see anything wrong in
building cantonments because most Tamils (including myself) want the
army to vacate the private properties they occupy in Jaffna and Vanni
so that lawful owners could return. Therefore, the armed forces
personnel need alternative permanent housing, which is what the
government is doing. What’s the fuss about? Moreover, building of
cantonments and army personnel living with their families will help
reduce violence against civilian women.

Those who cry foul of such military cantonments are the ones
vociferously seek the army occupation of private properties to end.
They cannot have both ways. Of course they may want the army to be
withdrawn from the North, which is premature to me. Any hasty
withdrawal of the army in the North would lead to mafias such as
pro-government militias and common criminals taking over the reins of
power, which is very dangerous to the future of the local communities.
During the run up to the Presidential and Parliamentary elections
early this year the army cut back its visible presence on the streets
of Jaffna peninsula; the results have been rise in burglaries, chain
snatching along the streets, and kidnapping for ransom by
pro-government militias and common criminals.

To my knowledge nobody has provided credible evidence by way of
pictures or testimonies to the effect of “mushrooming” Buddhist
temples, name changes of places, or settlement of ordinary Sinhalese
people in the Vanni.

12. How would you describe and differentiate between Tamil grievances
and aspirations since the end of the civil war? How important is a
political settlement and what form do you think it should
realistically take?

Tamil grievances in terms of human security, selective discrimination,
lack of use of Tamil language in public administration, etc, persist
in the aftermath of the civil war. However, political settlement does
not seem to be the priority for the Tamils in the short term (as
reflected in the very low turnout at the Presidential and
Parliamentary elections early this year); instead economic
emancipation appears to be the thirst of Tamil people in the immediate
future.

Such economic emancipation does not mean just rebuilding their homes
and livelihoods, but also includes non-interference by Colombo or the
national government as regards the type of economic development
activities they would like to undertake. Local governments and
provincial governments should be empowered to take decisions through
consultations with the local communities. An equal opportunities law
should also be enacted to outlaw discrimination in terms of gender,
ethnicity, religion, caste, or place of origin like in countries such
as the United Kingdom or Australia (this was proposed by the
government in the late-1990s under President Chandrika Kumaratunge and
then withdrawn due to opposition by vested interests). In addition, an
affirmative action programme could be instituted for a limited period
of time to increase the representation of minority communities (gender
as well) in public administration and services in proportion to their
population share.

In the medium and long term, economic and political power sharing
between the centre and the provinces is indispensable for establishing
durable peace in Sri Lanka. My hunch is that economic freedom (as
mooted by me in the following publication
http://pointpedro.org/images/WorkingPapers/ppid%20working%20paper%2012.pdf)
and an equal opportunities law (in the short-run) will satisfy sixty
percent of the aspirations of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka, and
political power sharing (in the long-run) will satisfy the remaining
forty percent.

But the Rajapaksha government does not seem to be interested in any of
the foregoing. Instead, the government is very keen to see that no
single political party (headed by Tamils) dominates politics either in
the North or East. As part of the divide-and-rule grand strategy of
the Rajapakshas, while the EPDP is given a free reign in the Jaffna
peninsula, Kumaran Pathmanathan is promoted in the Vanni; in the East,
while the TMVP is pampered in Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts,
Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan is allowed to have bases in the Ampara
district.

13. How would you describe the conditions and treatment of Tamil
civilians who were placed in IDP camps at the end of the civil war?
What were the problems and how were they alleviated over the last 12
months? How many are currently remaining in IDP camps?

The conditions and treatment of Tamil civilians in the IDP camps were
pathetic. Sri Lankan public services or the NGOs were/are not capable
of handling such a large number of IDPs at any one place. Although I
would blame the LTTE for instigating such a huge internal
displacement, my view is that the government need not have brought
them all to Vavuniya or Mannar districts. The government could have
allowed the IDPs from Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar and Vavuniya to go
to their places of origin within a month after the end of the civil
war. The problem of landmines has been overplayed to my knowledge and
had been used as an excuse to delay the release of civilians from
welfare camps.

While innocent civilians languished in squalor in welfare camps, many
people with money and/or influence (including LTTE and TRO personnel)
got out of the camps and fled abroad (to India for instance). I know
of at least two cabinet ministers and many armed forces personnel
involved in making big money out of the misery of the IDPs.
Overcrowding and lack of bathroom and toilet facilities were the
longstanding problems in the camps. Food supply was also inadequate at
times.

Currently there are about 36,000 IDPs remaining in camps throughout
the North according to government statistics; the actual number could
be more. These remaining IDPs do have freedom of movement – i.e. they
could go out of the camps and return.

14. Tell us about the sentiment of Tamil civilians who escaped from
the LTTE in last five months of 2009? To what extent is there
bitterness against the LTTE due to its harsh treatment of civilians in
the final stages of the war?

There is a lot of antipathy towards the LTTE, which will last for a
long time. The LTTE forced the civilians to flee along with them (as
human shield) right up to the beaches of northern Mullaitivu. Once the
civilians vacated their homes, the LTTE cadres looted the household
goods and building materials such as asbestos sheets, roof tiles,
window and door frames, etc (in the same way as during the enforced
exodus of civilians in the Jaffna peninsula during late-1995 /
early-1996). Civilians (particularly women) were forced to part with
the jewellery they were wearing (General Sarath Fonseka revealed in
Parliament in August 2010 that during his tenure last year about 200
kilograms of gold belonging to the LTTE were unearthed in the Vanni
and more after he retired from service and he does not know what has
happened to it). The young and old were randomly conscripted to work
for the LTTE; either to fight or do subsidiary duties such as manning
sentry points, carrying arms, ammunition, and cargo.

For the first time the LTTE deployed male and female cadres together
in the same bunker that had resulted in underage pregnancies. There
are numerous underage single mothers in the North as a result. The
LTTE sucked money and blood out of civilians right up to the end. For
example, it was charging LKR.1,000 (USD.10) per minute of satellite
telephone calls to kith and kin in government controlled areas and
abroad from the Vanni.

Unfortunately, the Rajapaksha regime has failed to capitalise on the
resentment of the Tamil civilians towards the LTTE. The priority of
the Rajapakshas was consolidation of political power rather than
winning the broken hearts and minds of northern Tamils. Rajapakshas
were more interested in pampering to the parochial euphoria of the
majority community (playing to the gallery) rather than bonding a
fractured nation. If you remember what King Asoka in India did after
the epic victory in the battlefield and compare it with President
Rajapaksha’s behavior in the aftermath of the civil war, you could
distinguish between a genuine Buddhist and a fake Buddhist.

Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe is analyst who specializes in South Asian
and Indian Ocean Region politics and security.

http://www.groundviews.org/2010/11/10/jaffna-and-the-north-of-sri-lanka-today-post-war-realities-challenges-and-opportunities/

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