[lg policy] Belarusization

Tue Mar 12 15:59:54 UTC 2019

Belarusization 2.0.: Will the Russian threat help Belarusization?
Alesia Rudnik <https://belarusdigest.com/story/author/alesia-rudnik/>
12 March 2019

On 2 March 2019 Alexander Lukashenka held his annual conference with
journalists. The so-called “Big Conversation” lasted seven hours. The
marathon session both clarified and blurred official positions on issues of
security, closer integration with Russia, and Russian propaganda in Belarus.

At the same time, in the context of recent discussions about the potential
annexation of Belarus by Russia, Lukashenka’s public statements on the
importance of preserving national heritage and language have grown more
frequent. For example, Lukashenka asserted: “If you are the nation, you
have to have your own language.” In recent months, he made a public speech
in Belarusian, called on citizens to remember the Grand Duchy of Lithuania,
and declared that Belarusian sovereignty will not suffer from blackmail and gas
disputes
<https://belarusdigest.com/story/russia-and-belarus-clash-over-oil-revenues-belarusian-state-press-digest/>.

A policy of Belarusization may prove decisive in deterring the Russian
world and protecting Belarusian sovereignty. However, a superficial
Belarusization orchestrated by Lukashenka and directed at external actors
could have a negative effect on Belarusian language and culture. Instead of
genuine Belarusization and the development of the Belarusian language, such
a policy only awakens Russian propaganda and leaves Russian language
dominating education, the judiciary and the media.
Limited space for the development of the Belarusian language

The Belarusian population continues to Russify more and more. According to
a 2018 study by the IPM Research Centre, only 2.2% of Belarusians speak
Belarusian at home, while 73.7% use Russian; 12.3% speak both and 11.6% use
a mixture of the two languages. According to recently published data from
the 2009 population census (not previously published), the state of the
Belarusian language has declined. The recent data demonstrates that only
57.4% of Belarusians named the titular language as their native language. With
further Russification, the numbers speaking Belarusian may significantly
decrease when data from the 2019 census is collected.

What language do you speak at home? Data from 2009 population census. Data:
belstat.gov.by

A rapid Russification of the Belarusian population primarily occurs through
Russian-language media. Three of the nine TV-channels included in the
standard TV package are Russian and the rest use Russian as the main
language. Belarus buys the majority of its TV shows from Russia and
broadcasts these even on the Belarusian-language channels.

Russian propaganda has a wide influence through the Russian TV channels
that predominate Belarusian TV. Monitoring by the Belarusian Association of
Journalists shows that promotion of the notion of a “Russian world” takes
place through Russian TV shows of both political and non-political
character and broadcast on the nine official TV channels in Belarus.

Although experts continue to talk about the so-called “soft” Belarusization
in the cultural and entertainment sectors, the use of the Belarusian
language in state and education institutions continues to fall. The
festivals of *Vyshyvanka *(traditional embroidered shirts), cultural events
and growing usage of Belarusian language by business
<https://belarusdigest.com/story/soft-belarusisation-in-hrodna/> show an
interest in the language rather than its development.

Besides the Russification of the educational system, the growing interest
of young people to the Belarusian language is competing with a brain-drain
<https://belarusdigest.com/story/brain-drain-in-belarus-do-dreams-come-true-abroad/>.
2018 marked a record year in so far as around 11,000 Belarusians emigrated
to other countries for work, with a total of almost 95,000 Belarusians
officially working abroad according to Mikhail Myasnikovich
<http://belarusprofile.com/en/profile/miasnikovic-michail-uladzimiravic>,
the Chairman of the Council of the Republic, cited in* Zviazda*. In these
conditions, English becomes even more popular than Belarusian for young
professionals, as does Polish among workers moving to Poland.
Soft Belarusization: External policy rather than an internal course

On 25 March 2018 Minsk saw one of the biggest celebrations of Freedom Day,
organised through crowd-funding. The peculiarity of the event was that the
authorities approved the celebration – in contrast to many other events
organised by oppositional leaders in the past. Last year’s Freedom Day BNR
100
<https://belarusdigest.com/story/one-hundred-years-of-belarus-independence-proclamation-uniting-the-nation-or-dividing-the-opposition/>
(the
centenary of the foundation of the Belarusian Republic) appeared as yet
another sign of soft Belarusisation and gave hope for some liberalisation
in the country.

This year activists applied to hold Freedom Day celebrations at the Dynama
Stadium, which the authorities are preparing for the 2019 European Games
<https://belarusdigest.com/story/the-2019-european-games-circuses-instead-of-bread/>.
However, the authorities rejected this year’s application stating that the
stadium is not yet ready for concerts. The Belarusian pop-singer Alexandr
Saladuha subsequently received permission to perform in the stadium, which
some oppositional activists see as a way of restricting their access to the
stadium. During the “Big Conversation” Lukashenka also said that he sees no
sense in celebrating Freedom Day 101 in the city centre.

Celebration of  Freedom Day BNR 100 in 2018, Minsk. Source: Euroradio.fm

Although the pressure on the opposition and the initiatives referring to
the Belarusian national idea continues, Lukashenka himself does not shy
away from playing the language card. Thus, on 9 January Lukashenka
delivered part of a speech in Belarusian. The Belarusian president has done
this before, for example in 2014.

The speech in the Belarusian language, coupled with statements from
Lukashenka during the ongoing Russian-Belarusian gas dispute, awoke
Russia’s propaganda machine. Russian media spread information claiming that
“Belarusian nationalists plan to ruin the country” and that “Lukashenka has
betrayed Russia.”

During the “Big Conversation”, Lukashenka said he does not understand why
Russia tries to spread its ideology of the Russian world in Belarus since
Belarusians already think like Russians and speak the same language.

The Belarusian language card serves Lukashenka who wants to quieten
supporters of the national idea by showing he is not trying to Russify
Belarus. The same card is played when it comes to relations with Russia:
here it demonstrates sovereignty and difference from Russia. However, in
one or another way, Lukashenka uses this card only to benefit the regime
and can barely have a relation to the policy of Belarusization anymore.
*Genuine Belarusization instead of imitation*

Lukashenka’s appeal for the importance of preserving the national language
and culture appears as an attempt to strengthen his position by attracting
the support of national and opposition forces in the event of Russian
aggression. Additionally, he might aim to decrease negative rhetoric
regarding his announcement to run again for the presidency (by presenting
himself as an advocate of independence, language and culture). Lukashenka
may believe that against the backdrop of Russian pressure he can attract
more support from the part of the electorate that has never voted for him
before.

Although positive rhetoric towards the Belarusian language became more
visible, there exists a lack of investments into the language
popularisation in education and media. In fact, Belarusization turns into a
political tool of foreign policy rather than a genuine movement. If the
regime aims to deter the influence of Russian propaganda, Belarusization
policy should first of all focus on real reform in all spheres and not mere
symbolic steps.

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 Harold F. Schiffman

Professor Emeritus of
 Dravidian Linguistics and Culture
Dept. of South Asia Studies
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6305

Phone:  (215) 898-7475
Fax:  (215) 573-2138

Email:  haroldfs at gmail.com
http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/~haroldfs/

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