The End of Linguistics

[Lev Michael]

One of the issues that is vexing is the definition of "science", and
another is the criteria for considering a set of research activities
to be " *a* science".

An entire discipline (philosophy of science), and several
subdisciplines of other ones (history of science, ethnography of
science) are devoted to these questions, so my discussion will
necessarily be rather anemic in comparison to ones in those fields.

I would like to take a moderate position here (which merges the
descriptive and proscriptive!) and characterize science as a practice
of empirical investigation that works to develop a discourse that
allows for substantial intersubjectivity between investigators, and
which places a premium on crafting propositions that can be
falsified, to the consensual satisfaction of the investigative
community, by empirical evidence that can in principle be obtained by
any investigator involved in the community of investigative practice.
(Try this definition out on physics, literary criticism, evolutionary
biology, psychoanalysis, history, botany,  astrology, religious
doctrine, and op-ed political analysis, to see how it works).  This
definition is not perfect, but I think it draws the line more or less
where most people would put it (i.e. physics and botany on one side,
astrology and op-eds on the other, social sciences somewhere
in-between).

I think that the activities on Halpern's list are examples of
science, by this characterization of science.

In this definition I said nothing about subject matter.  This is
because investigative practice and subject matter tend to
dialectically shape each other, and because neither is really stable.
For example, any definition of physics in terms of subject matter
fails horribly (try it!).

Similarly, one might ask, is there a solid difference between the
subject matter of physical chemistry (a subfield of chemistry) and
that of chemical physics (a subfield of physics), or do these
'different' sciences derive from the topography of academia?

Then there is the question of scientific 'unity', with physics as its
examplar.  What is behind the unity of physics, and what does it mean
for linguistics?

The unity that some perceive in physics derives, I would argue, from
the dominance of two major theoretical frameworks: quantum mechanics
and general relativity. These frameworks take on different forms in
different 'limits': in the large particle number /low-energy limit
these theories reduce to Newtonian mechanics and classical
thermodynamics; in the small particle number/ low speeds and low
space-time curvature limit, they reduce to Newtonian mechanics or
special relativity.  In turn, combinations of these theories and
their 'limited' forms can be applied to different physical systems:
stellar objects, high-energy particles, crystals, liquids, etc, to
yield astrophysics, particle physics, sold-state physics, fluid
mechanics, etc.  Originally, of course, some of these theories were
thought to be quite distinct, and the kind of theoretical unity we
see now is really an artifact of the 20th century.  18th century
physics looked a lot like linguistics does now in terms of the
diversity of its theoretical frameworks.

Similarly, quantum mechanics and general relativity are frameworks
employed in other fields.  Does that mean that chemistry is really
physics because it uses quantum mechanics sometimes?  Physicists
frequently joke (to the intense annoyance of chemists) that chemistry
is really just a sub-field of physics, and (to the annoyance of
biologists), that biology is a subfield of chemistry, and so on.  You
could just as easily imagine, however, physics being split into
multiple fields, along parameterizations of energy, particle number,
etc.

Now though, while there is a demonstrable diversity in topics of
research in physics, there is a sense that everyone is working from a
certain set of shared assumptions.  This does not mean, however, that
someone working on the dynamics of flowing sand will really be able
to converse with someone working on field instabilities in fusion
reactors.  Moreover, in cutting-edge physics there is rampant
disagreement over the direction research should take and the
principles that should guide it.  Andrew Pickering's history of
particle physics in the 1970s and 1980s shows this aspect of physics
quite clearly. I don't know what this does for the 'football team'
metaphor.

There is, however, substantial agreement over certain basic
theoretical positions (i.e. quantum mechanics and special
relativity).  They are considered, to be, for the most part, closed
chapters (there are dissenters, however!). I don't think that there
is a lot more to the appearance of disciplinary unity than the idea
that everyone can trace their work back to these two pillars.  These
pillars are not necessarily part of the every-day work of most
physicists, however, and are also employed by non-physicists.

Now, we might ask, are there any similar 'closed chapters' in
linguistics?  I think that the notion of underlying phonological
representation (in phonology), generative phrase structure (in
syntax), and turn-taking organization in conversation (interactive
sociolinguistics), are candidates.  Of course, there is disagreement
over how these cash out with respect to particular phenomena and
particular data sets, but that is also true of physical theories.

So, is linguistics *a* science? Maybe, maybe not. I don't think it is
ultimately a very profound issue, and I don't think that a "no"
answer spells the end of linguistics.

If we look at academia diachronically, we see a process by which
disciplines (and sciences!) split, recombine, and novel disciplines
suddenly emerge.  Establishing a discipline (say, linguistics) as
'distinct' is very important for academic political reasons (e.g.
access to funding, faculty positions, etc), but we shouldn't confuse
disciplinary boundaries for solid ontological  distinctions.  We
might come back in a century and find "linguistics" departments full
of sociolinguists, with "formal linguists"  in cognitive science
departments, or "linguistics" departments may be full of formal
linguists, with socio-linguists and descriptive linguists in
anthropology departments.  Or, as I suspect, "linguistics"  will
remain diverse, a diversity that derives from the complexity and
subtlety of the phenomena with which linguists (and anthropologists
and cognitive scientists), in their great variety, contend.

Maybe this is one way of answering Halpern.

-Lev

****************
Lev Michael
Department of Anthropology
University of Texas at Austin


>At 10:04 AM +0800 01.3.27, Kerim Friedman wrote:>
>
>  > In making this argument I did not set out to prove that linguistics is a
>  >science, only that the argument that he made for proving it was
>not a science
>  >was false.
>
>That is precisely where you made your mistake. If you read carefully, you
>will discover that Halpern does not argue that linguistics is not a science;
>he argues that it isn't likely to become one. He could be wrong, but these
>are different propositions. You were arguing against a straw man.
>
>As I wrote before, but will rephrase now, if you wish to address his actual
>statements you can either
>
>(1) demonstrate that the convergence he does not see is underway
>(2) redefine "science" in a way that makes the lack of convergence
>irrelevant, or
>(3) deny any interest in science whatsoever--which seems to be Celso's
>current tack.
>
>If there's a (4), I don't see it. Perhaps someone can enlighten me.
>
>P.S. Among the self-righteous posturings that make up the bulk of this
>thread, there have been some glimmerings of recognition that linguistics is
>by no means alone in being exposed to the kind of attack that Halpern
>launches. The problem is endemic to most of what we are pleased to call the
>humanities and the social sciences--where, arguably, current disciplinary
>boundaries are to reality what national boundaries in Africa are to the
>distribution of tribes. If you want to know why, I recommend Robert Murphy
>(1971), to which Allen Chun has just put me on by citing Murphy at length in
>"From Text to Context: How Anthropology Makes Its Subject", Cultural
>Anthropology, Vol. 15, No. 4, November, 2000, pp. 570-595.
>
>
>Cheers,
>
>
>
>John McCreery
>The Word Works, Ltd.
>Tel +81-45-314-9324
>Fax +81-45-316-4409
>email mccreery at gol.com
>
>"Making Symbols is Our Business"
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