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Celso Alvarez Caccamo
lxalvarz at udc.es
Thu Nov 14 14:19:12 UTC 2002
uk>
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Peter Patrick wrote:
> Eg, one could argue about definitions of discourse, and the=
features
>that Celso lists would surely play a role in the argument, but one cannot
>sensibly assert that there is consensus among linguists about a definition
>of "discourse" or "speech event" such that we must all agree with him. (I'm
>not planning to argue about it at present, though it's certainly within the
>purview of this list.) Thus it is not logical to offer his definition and
>then conclude by assertion that gibbons don't have discourse. They may not
>have Celso-discourse, perhaps, if indeed all 9 of his listed elements prove
>to be absent -- an ascertainable set of facts about which no-one has made
>any argument here yet.
Well, I didn't have a "definition" of discourse -- I commented on Ron's=20
support of Crystal's definition. It was not my intention to offer a closed,=
=20
a priori definition of discourse and then work my way up to deprive poor=20
gibbons from such a wonderful resource -- one good enough, for example, to=
=20
talk about discourse. I wasn't even referring per se to all of Hockett's 13=
=20
'design features', or to Chomsky, or to Thorpe. But, hey, if you don't=20
have reflexivity and metalanguage (which, to my knowledge, no other species=
=20
has), you'd hardly be able to communicate: "No, I didn't mean that: I meant=
=20
the opposite", or to communicate "Honey, shall I reply now or you'd rather=
=20
machine-gun me with more questions?", or the like. That is, you wouldn't be=
=20
able to do what we humans constantly do with discourse, which is to refer=20
to things and to point to discourse itself simultaneously through all sorts=
=20
of implicit and explicit resources for reflexivity, not to speak of=20
deliberately lying (prevarication), and of course displacement. So, if=20
primates (as far as I know) don't possess reflexivity, metalanguage,=20
displacement, or prevarication (deceiving is not the same, and it's not=20
linguistic; see below), the "discourse" they may build with their language=
=20
is so far removed from human discourse that I don't see the point in=20
calling it discourse. (It's just like calling the entire universe a=20
"text": it's poetic, but doesn't say what is its nature).
Of course all this tell us little about what gibbon communication is like,=
=20
which is the whole point under discussion. Now, the problem is, if we start=
=20
with the strong version of our research question ("What are the gender=20
differences in gibbon discourse?"), we better bring up quite solid=20
arguments that we can refer to sex-based behavior differences as "gender"=20
based, and that indeed these differences manifest in some form of social,=20
reflexive, agentive conduct we can call "discourse". But the way I see it,=
=20
the previous question is predesigned and framed so that what is suggested=20
is that differences in communication abilities between species are blurred=
=20
a priori, which is the most non-empirical way to go about it. The=20
expression "gibbon discourse" (=3D"the discourse of gibbons") contains one=
of=20
those famous "existential pressupositions" by which the existence of an=20
entity with characteristics such that we can call it "discourse of gibbons"=
=20
is taken for granted (just think of: "Is gibbon discourse more complex than=
=20
ant discourse?"). But the burden of proof for anyone posing such a question=
=20
is that such a pressuposition is satisfied in the real world. And that's=20
the whole point: first look and find, then name accordingly. The "weaker"=20
research question ("What are the sex differences in gibbon communication?")=
=20
doesn't give you those problems: sex differences exist, and gibbons=20
communicate. Remember all this arose from Janina asking about a student's=20
dissertation research.
But it is interesting to see that this decaffeination of "discourse" to=20
include primate vocalizations can be easily accepted by the academic=20
community; I guess the next step would be to talk about the ideology of=20
bees (whose particular dances, by the way, have always been called, to my=20
knowledge, "dialects", in quotation marks, as we all know they are not=20
learnable by other bees and therefore they are not comparable to dialects=20
in human languages).
Peter also says:
> I'm also reminded of something i saw not long ago in the news,
>probably misquoting as usual, from primate research findings. I can't even
>remember which primates, I'm afraid, but deceptive behavior had been
>videotaped: one female creature was grooming a non-dominant male, situated
>in such a way that while she could see and be seen by the dominant male, he
>could not see that she was grooming the other. (Continuing the therapeutic
>vein, this was probably gratifying to any male academic researchers who
>might have been involved -- presumably non-dominant in general type...) If
>some sort of communication took place here, linguistic or not, between the
>female and the dominant male, we might be justified in concluding that
>deceptive communication occurred. And "lying" has, I dimly recall, been
>offered as a distinctly human property before... Another one bites the
>dust...?
I don't know if it's the same fact, but Steven Mithen refers, in _The=20
Prehistory of the Mind_, to some types of deception by chimps, for example:=
=20
(1) a female and a non-dominant male refrain from vocalization while=20
copulating so that the dominant male doesn't discover them; (2) a young,=20
non-dominant male shows his erect penis to a female while covering it from=
=20
the dominant male's sight. This last type of deception is important as it=20
lets us look into chimps' "theory of the mind". Mithen argues that the=20
younger male chimp who covers his penis is able to handle mental=20
representations of: his own knowledge, that of the dominant male, and that=
=20
of the female. This is quite an achievement, yes. But apparently humans=20
(Mithen says) are able to handle up to eight mental representations of=20
knowledge. Just look at: "I know that Laura thinks that Martin knows that=20
Sarah knows that John knows that Laura had an affair". It may take a while,=
=20
but we're able to figure out a plausible situation for this Falcon Crest,=20
right? And if we aren't able, we ask, which is discourse ;-) .
Now, Mithen doesn't argue that chimps' behavior showing their "theory of=20
mind" has anything to do with "linguistic intelligence", but with social=20
intelligence put at the service of their (and ours) very animal interests:=
=20
sex and food.
Repressing vocalizations, like in (1) or in certain experiments with chimps=
=20
is believed to be the beginning of displacement (perhaps first present in=20
Homo Erectus, so they say). However, what hasn't been found is that the=20
two frolicking chimps, the day after doing it, discursively say to each=20
other "Hey, what a good time we had!" - "Yes!, what about more later?",=20
which would be true displacement. As for (2), deception is not exactly=20
prevarication (saying the untrue), and, besides, covering a part of one's=20
body is not linguistic. A researcher also reports somewhere that her doggy=
=20
would "lie" to her as the dog would start limping when she would walk him=20
where he didn't like it; in a little manual, Jean Aitchinson easily debunks=
=20
this researcher's argument about animals "lying": that definition of=20
"lying" is unsustainable.
In sum: having quite a smart mind doesn't necessarily mean having=20
discourse. In my book, discourse implies not only reference but planning,=20
feedback, agency, reflexivity, coherence, cohesion, recall, recycling,=20
voicing, indexicality, turn structure, negotiation, contextualization,=20
recursivity... It's interesting that, to my knowledge, very little has been=
=20
done to link theoretically features of discourse or conversation (except=20
some privileged notions, such as reflexivity) to, precisely, the "design=20
features" of human language. It's my humble opinion.
-celso
Celso Alvarez C=E1ccamo
lxalvarz at udc.es
http://www.udc.es/dep/lx/cac/
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