Edge and universalism vs. particularism

[Wolfgang Schulze]

Dear all [sorry for possible doubled posting, but I'm not sure whether my post has reached the list before]

it was Melville Herskovits (1950: 116) who once said: « Les individus d'une société donnée sont si proches de leurs traditions qu'ils sont beaucoup plus impressionnés par les différences entre eux et leurs voisins que par les ressemblances ». Obviously, the perception, interpretation, and ‘scientifization’ of differences is related to operations of human cognition as such. Hence, we might argue that certain preferences in Linguistic Typology to highlight ‘differences’ and to be more tacit about commonalities is not just a pure scientific program proposed ‘by the data’. Rather, we can assume that human preferences for observing differences are regulated and conventionalized in a given society to a different extent, ending up in corresponding paradigms of perceptional behavior. These paradigms are strongly related to processes of ‘data’ accumulation (Christian has alluded to this point already): With respect to Linguistics, I call phases of massive data accumulation ‘Mithridates’ phases (related to the two ‘Mithridates’ books we have (Gessner 1555 and Adelung 1806) that symbolize periods of assimilating massively fresh linguistic data related e.g. to early colonialism in Gessner's times). Such periods tended to end up in a critical mass that again provoked a shift of paradigm: The more differences show up the more people are interested in finding commonalities (Port Royal, to give an example), especially if corresponding paradigms (e.g. human universalism) become popular. Turning again to the quote from Herskovits given above, such phases of ‘universalism’ seem to be less stable that those of particularism. Nevertheless I dare to say that preferences for universalism or particularism are strongly embedded in given paradigms of social behavior to ‘the other’. Describing differences may have a higher surplus in certain societies (or in the community of linguists) at a certain time, or whereas other societies (or the community of linguists) strongly favor a perspective of universalism in other times.

Hence, the question of whether or not linguistic universalism has a tail wind not only is a classical ‘scientific’ question (if ever it is), but mainly a socially driven one. We can perhaps escape from this by eliminating the concept of ‘language universals’ (except for descriptive purpose). Discussing universals would then not be related to the question of whether languages are basically ‘the same’, but what causes (from a pre-linguistic point of view) observed parallels. Hence, the classical idea of constraints comes up that can be related to universal patterns of human cognition and biology. Accordingly, linguistic universals are not given ‘as such’, but are grounded in pre-linguistic universals that condition certain constraints on language structures (such as linearization (and its consequences), perceptual schemas (e.g. figure/ground discrimination), the architecture of memory  allowing object permanence (Piaget)) and so on. In this sense, a discourse about ‘universalism’ would be embedded in the broader discourse about the (hopefully uncontroversial) universality  of human beings, a topic that will never retire (I hope). Language Typology (in terms of both 'difference-' and 'type-highlighting' approaches) would then  serve as a highly relevant ancillary science for this enterprise, but as it is true for all ancillary sciences: It can likewise be something of its own right (which would be favored by society also because it fuels social patterns of 'enjoying' exotisms and differences).

Best wishes,
Wolfgang          

Am 10.03.2014 21:31, schrieb Matthew Dryer:
> I have often commented informally to other linguists that there are two kinds of typologists, those who are more interested in the way that languages are similar to each other and those who are more interested in the way that languages are different from each other.  Of course, many typologists fall in between, but at least many typologists “lean” more in one direction.
>
> Frans is quite right of course, that the mission of LT is both enterprises.  It may, however, be the case that there is some imbalance in papers in LT, an imbalance that may reflect current fashion.  I read Frans’ email as lamenting this imbalance rather than a suggestion that one enterprise is more important than the other.
>
> But I see no need for chauvinistic comments like those of Christian. The idea that the search for diversity is somehow less scientific than the search for similarity is nonsense.  Science is the pursuit of truth, whether that truth involves diversity or similarity.  Some of the recent swing toward diversity is precisely a reaction to a tendency for linguists to make false claims about similarity and hence is precisely making linguistics more scientific.
>
> It is also very misleading to suggest that the search for typological diversity is similar to the famous view of Joos.  For one thing, the very question of how languages might differ with respect to some phenomenon was not a question that interested Joos.  Second, the search for typological diversity is, contrary to what Christian suggests, impossible without abstraction.  One cannot recognize that some phenomenon in a given language is unusual without abstracting over phenomena across languages.
>
> I see nothing in Frans’ comments to suggest he thinks the search for diversity is unscientific or that that search is not an essential part of typology.  I read his email as lamenting that there is too little attention paid to similarities.
>
> Matthew
> _______________________
>
> Matthew Dryer, Professor
> Department of Linguistics
> 616 Baldy Hall
> University at Buffalo (SUNY)
> Buffalo NY 14260
> Phone: 716-645-0122
>     FAX: 716-645-3825
> dryer at buffalo.edu