18.218, Qs: Rules and Representations: A Ghost in the Machine

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LINGUIST List: Vol-18-218. Mon Jan 22 2007. ISSN: 1068 - 4875.

Subject: 18.218, Qs: Rules and Representations: A Ghost in the Machine

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===========================Directory==============================  

1)
Date: 18-Jan-2007
From: Carlos Garcia Wegener < cgw at uniovi.es >
Subject: Rules and Representations: A Ghost in the Machine 

	
-------------------------Message 1 ---------------------------------- 
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2007 00:44:48
From: Carlos Garcia Wegener < cgw at uniovi.es >
Subject: Rules and Representations: A Ghost in the Machine 
 

1. Do modern linguistic theories (specially Chomsky's MP) assume, more or
less explicitly, Marr's distinction between computational, algorithmic, and
implementational levels, even if in Jackendoff's version (brain /
computational mind / phenomenological mind)?

2. And, if this is the case, are linguistic representations assumed to be
'autonomous' and more or less independent of neurobiological processes, as
the computer-metaphor asserts?

3. Why not to identify linguistic computations with different states of
brain's activity at different levels of organization (distributed systems,
local systems, circuits ...) and only a 'behavioural' level of organization
above Marr's (simplistic) implementational level.

4. How can a hypothetical computational level of representation of
cognitive processes 'exorcise the ghost in the machine'? Aren't
computations the modern homunculus?

5. Is the mind/brain distinction (and specially the computer-metaphor) a
new instantiation of cartesian dualism, as hold, for example, by Damasio or
Changeux & Dehaene? 

Linguistic Field(s): Linguistic Theories





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