37.3139, Diss: Philosophy of Language: Maciej Tarnowski: "Moore’s Paradox in Language and Thought: Towards a Unified Strategy of Explanation"

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LINGUIST List: Vol-37-3139. Thu Oct 01 2026. ISSN: 1069 - 4875.

Subject: 37.3139, Diss: Philosophy of Language: Maciej Tarnowski: "Moore’s Paradox in Language and Thought: Towards a Unified Strategy of Explanation"

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Date: 30-Sep-2026
From: Maciej Tarnowski [maciej.tarnowski at uj.edu.pl]
Subject: Moore’s Paradox in Language and Thought: Towards a Unified Strategy of Explanation


Institution: University of Warsaw
Program: Faculty of Philosophy
Degree Date: 2025
Level: PhD

Author: Maciej Tarnowski

Dissertation Title: Moore’s Paradox in Language and Thought: Towards a
Unified Strategy of Explanation

Dissertation URL: https://philpapers.org/rec/TARMPI-4

Linguistic Field(s): Philosophy of Language

Dissertation Director(s): Tadeusz Ciecierski

Dissertation Abstract:

This dissertation provides an exploration of Moore’s Paradox, which is
the philosophical puzzle (noted first by G.E. Moore) posed by
sentences of the form “p, but I don’t believe that p” and “p, but I
believe that ~p”. Such sentences seem infelicitous to assert and
irrational to believe, even though they are meaningful and consistent
– therefore, their infelicity or irrationality constitutes a
philosophical puzzle and invites theorizing concerning the limits of
coherent speech and thought. The dissertation aims to establish
theoretical ramifications for solving Moore’s Paradox both as a
problem concerning assertion and belief and eventually – suggest one
such solution. The dissertation is organized into five chapters and a
conclusion: the first chapter introduces necessary terminology and
outlines the argumentative strategy of the further chapters; the
second and third chapters discuss the sources of infelicity judgments
concerning Moorean speech; the fourth and fifth concern irrationality
of Moorean beliefs.
Chapter 1. starts with introducing the paradox and the necessary
philosophical terminology, and a critical discussion of the two
historically important approaches to it: G. E. Moore’s and Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s. Based on observing the flaws of these two accounts, I
argue that a successful solution to Moore’s Paradox needs to
simultaneously account for its problematic nature in both speech and
thought. Further on, I formulate the guiding hypothesis of the
dissertation based on Sydney Shoemaker’s (1995) Priority of Belief
thesis, according to which a successful explanation of
Moore-paradoxicality should be provided in belief terms, while the
infelicity of Moorean assertions can be accounted for by proposing
that assertion as a speech act is minimally subject to a normative
expectation that it expresses a rational belief of a speaker. In the
end, the chapter discusses methodological issues related to the study
of the paradox, such as the justification of intuitive infelicity and
irrationality judgments, defining Moore-paradoxicality and the
relationship between sentences and their propositional content.
Chapter 2 investigates contemporary theories of assertion in relation
to the rational belief constraint introduced in Chapter 1. and their
capacity to handle Moorean infelicity data. The chapter critiques
various non-doxastic accounts of assertion from theorists such as
Weiner (2005), Douven (2006), and Lackey (2007), finding them
insufficient in addressing Moorean infelicity. It then evaluates
alternative theories proposed by Williamson (2000), Kvanvig (2009),
and Stanley (2008), which align with the hypothesis that rational
belief constrains assertion. The chapter introduces and defends the
discourse-sensitive account of assertoric warrant, which allows the
derivation of discourse-specific norms of assertion and provides a
robust explanation for the varying infelicity judgments concerning
Moorean sentences with respect to the discourse in which they appear,
while integrating insights from different theoretical perspectives.
Chapter 3 extends the discussion to non-assertoric speech acts,
examining whether Moore-paradoxicality is confined to assertions or
whether it also affects other types of speech acts. By utilizing Kent
Bach and Robert Harnish’s speech act taxonomy (1979) and Robert
Stalnaker’s “common ground” framework for analysis of pragmatic
effects of speech acts (1974), the chapter argues that one can explain
the infelicity of Moorean non-assertoric acts by proposing that
non-assertoric speech acts could be analyzed as proposals to alter the
conversational common ground. This analysis supports the broader
applicability of the explanation based on the Priority of Belief
hypothesis provided in Chapter 2., addressing cases involving
non-assertoric speech acts such as promises, orders, apologies, or
conventional speech acts.
Chapter 4 focuses on the irrationality of Moorean beliefs, comparing
two strategies of explaining it: one that identifies its source in the
violation of rational self-knowledge constraints (Introspectionist
strategy), and another, which sees it as a consequence of the
self-defeating nature of such beliefs (Self-Defeat strategy). By
formalizing the commitments of the two approaches in epistemic and
doxastic logic, the chapter demonstrates that while the Self-Defeat
approach has weaker theoretical commitments, it fails to account for
the irrationality of all Moore-paradoxical beliefs. The analysis
ultimately favors the Introspectionist approach, emphasizing the
robustness of the BB principle defended by Introspectionists,
according to which one is always in a position to rationally believe
that one believes that p if one believes that p.
Chapter 5 addresses the philosophical justification for introspection
principles like BB. The chapter defends the stronger KB principle,
according to which if one believes that p, then one is in a position
to know that one believes that p, against externalist critiques,
particularly anti-luminosity arguments advanced by Timothy Williamson
(2000). The chapter utilizes Alex Byrne’s (2018) externalist
transparency account of self-knowledge and argues that one may
justifiably restrict the scope of Williamson’s anti-luminosity
argument by holding that introspective knowledge of one’s doxastic
states is not subject to margin-for-error principles. While this move
allows one to uphold the KB principle, it also does not require
abandoning externalist intuitions about knowledge and entails the
rejection of the KK principle, according to which if one knows that p,
then one is in a position to know that one knows that p.
In conclusion, this dissertation argues that Moore’s Paradox can be
effectively resolved by integrating a normative approach to assertion
and other speech acts with robust introspective constraints on
rational belief, both by demonstrating the philosophical soundness of
this approach and comparing it to other solutions proposed in the
literature.



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