[parislinguists] programme Seminaire IJN mai 2004

[RISC]

De: Max Kistler <kistler at ext.jussieu.fr>

Programme du Séminaire de l'Institut Jean Nicod

chers collègues,

voici le programme des prochaines séances du séminaire général de 
l'Institut Jean Nicod.
Le programme du séminaire est régulièrement mis à jour en ligne, sur le 
site :

http://www.institutnicod.org/act.php?n=1

Le séminaire est ouvert.

Lieu: Institut Jean Nicod
1 bis av Lowendal
(le code de l'immeuble sera diffusé sur place aux personnes qui 
assistent
régulièrement au séminaire)
75007 Paris
Metro: Ecole Militaire ou Latour-Maubourg
Tel. ++33153593280
Fax. ++33153593299
page web www.institutnicod.org

Organisation et renseignements: Max Kistler (kistler at ehess.fr)

Heure: vendredi de 11h à 13h.

7 mai : Robert Van Rooy (Université d’Amsterdam) : “Language use and 
Lewisean signaling games”

Résumé:
David Lewis (1969) invented signaling games to study (the
nature and stability of) linguistic conventions. Although this work is
widely acknowledged as being important for the study of language,
until very recently signaling games didn't have any further impact on
linguistics. Still, these games have been studied and developed further
in economics and biology. In this talk I will argue that, based on some
of these further developments, signaling games can be applied to the
study of language use and language organization in ways beyond Lewis'
initial application.

14 mai : pas de séminaire

ATTENTION DATE INHABITUELLE:
Lundi 17 mai, 9h30 : Stephen Yablo (MIT) : Illusions of Possibility

Résumé:
It seems like cold could have turned out to be high mean molecular 
energy (HMME). But this isn't possible. How do we explain the illusion?
Two-dimensionalists blame it on the fact that there are worlds W such 
that cold really is HMME, supposing W is actual. I suggest that this 
style of explanation won't work for the related intuition that cold 
could have turned out to have a different microstructure than its 
actual one.
Kripke points to the fact that cold has a possible epistemic 
counterpart of cold -- call it fool's cold -- that really is HMME. But 
there is an ambiguity in Kripke's notion of "fool's X." On one 
interpretation fool's cold is possible, but it doesn't explain the 
illusion. Another sort of fool's cold would explain the illusion, but 
is arguably not possible. I explore the implications for Kripke's 
objection to the identity theory.

21 mai : Marcus Giaquinto (University College London) : 
"Non-propositional Thought".


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