seminaire =?iso-8859-1?Q?=E0_?=Paris8 le 5/11: Lisa Bylinina, Utrecht Univ, Gradability

[elenasoleil]

Les projets Structure Argumentale et Structure Aspectuelle, Langues avec
et Sans Articles

et l'Equipe Architecture Grammaticale de l'UMR 7023 Structures
Formelles du Langage

Ont le plaisir de vous inviter, dans le cadre d'une séance
réunie



à un exposé de

Lisa BYlinina

(UiL-OTS, University of Utrecht)



Titre :

Judge-dependence, experience and gradability



Date : le 5 novembre 2012

Heure : 10h00

Lieu :  Université de Paris 8 Vincennes – Saint Denis, salle D328

Plan d'accès:

http://www.umr7023.cnrs.fr/Plans-d-acces,672.html
<http://www.umr7023.cnrs.fr/Plans-d-acces,672.html>





Abstract:



The puzzle I will address is illustrated in (1-3):

(1) a. John finds this cake tasty.

b. John finds the Dom  Tower tall.

(2) a. I find apples tastier than bananas.

b. #I find John taller than Mary.

(3) a. Apples are tasty for / to John.

b. *The Dom Tower is tall for/to John.

(1) suggests that dimensional adjective (DA) tall is judge-dependent
(according to one of the diagnostics), just like predicates of personal
taste (PPTs), say, tasty or fun (Richard 2004; Anand 2009). (2) suggests
that it's not the DA itself that is judge-dependent, rather it's
its positive form, because comparative forms of DAs fail this test (2b)
(Saebo 2009; Paenen 2011; Kennedy 2012). Moreover, (3) shows that the
positive form of tall is not judge-dependent in exactly the same way as
PPTs are: for example, it does not take an overt judge for/to-phrase.
How can one account for the judge-dependence of tasty and tall in a way
that would predict the contrasts in (2) and (3)?

The difference like (3), among some others, can be taken to motivate a
`two kinds of subjectivity' analysis, where PPTs take a judge
argument (ï‚» contextualist analysis, see Lasersohn 2005, 2009),
while positive DAs do not, rather having an interpretation dependent on
the judge index of evaluation (ï‚» relativist analysis, see
Stojanovic 2007) (this is compatible with the view described in Kennedy
2012):

(4) a. [[tasty]]c; w, t, (j) = λx λy. y tastes good to x (in w
at t)

b. [[POS tall]]c; w, t, j = λx. height(x) > normj(height)

I broaden the range of facts to take into account in three ways: 1) I
look at more classes of adjectives, adding to PPTs and DAs two more
classes – evaluative adjectives like pretty, lazy and smart
(Bierwisch 1989) and extreme adjectives like gigantic or enormous
(Morzycki 2010); 2) I look at more constructions involving subjective
elements – too-constructions, positive construction with modal
standards (`functional' standards), comparative constructions
with modal standards, and different ways to express a judge in all of
them; 3) I look at a bit more languages – I discuss English,
Japanese and Russian, especially their person restrictions on the judge
(see also Moltmann 2010).

I won't be able to account for all the data I discuss, but, further
issues remaining, I will conclude that one doesn't need to postulate
two kinds of subjectivity. The issue of an extra argument is orthogonal
to the issue of judge dependence. In particular, it's not a
coincidence that all the subjective predicates that have a judge-like
argument are also experiencer predicates, while all the
`relativist'-like subjective items do not involve reference to
the perception experience, but in all other respects are as
judge-dependent as the experiencer ones. Thus, the `judge'
argument of PPTs is not the judge argument, but rather an experiencer
argument, and the relativist-like analysis of subjectivity is as good
for PPTs as for other classes of adjectives and constructions. Finally,
I deal with some complications that this view poses, and try to convince
the audience that this is still a more explanatory and intuitive way to
look at the issue.

REFERENCES

Anand, P. 2009. Kinds of taste. Unpublished manuscript.

Bierwisch, M. 1989. The semantics of gradation. In M. Bierwisch and E.
Lang (eds), Dimensional Adjectives: Grammatical Structure and Conceptual
Interpretation, Springer-Verlag,  Berlin, pp. 71-261.

Kennedy, C. 2012. Two Kinds of Subjectivity. To appear in Huitnik, J.
and C. Meier (eds), Subjective Meaning.

Lasersohn, P. 2005. Context dependence, disagreement, and predicates of
personal taste. Linguistics and Philosophy 28, 643-686.

Lasersohn, P. 2009. Relative truth, speaker commitment, and control of
implicit arguments. Synthese 166, 359-374.

Moltmann, F. 2010. Relative Truth and the First Person. Philosophical
Studies 150: 187-220.

Morzycki, M. 2010. Adjectival Extremeness: Degree Modification and
Contextually Restricted Scales. To appear in Natural Language and
Linguistic Theory.

Paenen, M. 2011. Big fun! Masters thesis, Institute for Linguistic OTS,
Utrecht  University.

Richard, M. 2004. Contextualism and relativism. Philosophical Studies
119: 215-242.

Saebo, K. J. 2009. Judgment ascriptions. Linguistics and Philosophy 34
(4): 327-352.

Stojanovic, I. 2007. Talking about Taste: Disagreement, Implicit
Arguments, and Relative Truth. Linguistics and Philosophy 30: 691-706.

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