faults of functionalism

[Chris Cleirigh]

Esa Itkonen wrote:

>The emphasis on biology (e.g. in recent messages) is misplaced. If
>e.g. in the study of grammaticalization one uses such terms as
>'problem-solving' or 'abductive inference', and if one means what
>one says (which may not always be the case, as we have learned),
>then it is clear that these terms/concepts have been developed in
>disciplines other than biology, and it is these disciplines, not
>biology, that should be consulted. (That is, biology is OK in the
>right place, but not in the wrong place.)

Reply:

Perhaps, rather than a summary dismissal of the appropriateness of biology to
linguistic issues, it would be useful to try to determine when it is
appropriate and when it is not.  Presumably, few (if anyone) would claim that
biological concepts are sufficient to model language, but this is quite
distinct from desiring biologically plausible linguistic models.

One way that biology can be helpful is in the testing and fine-tuning of
linguistic models that make biological claims.  Testing the biological
implications of an assertion such as that syntax is innate ("in-born" after
all) provides the opportunity to be explicit about what is meant by syntax and
in what sense it is claimed to be innate.


Esa Itkonen wrote:

>It is customary to ridicule the idea that there might be a
>clear distinction between study of human nature and study of
>inanimate nature. But this customary way of thinking should itself
>be ridiculed. There are absolutely no inferences made by inanimate
>things qua research objects but there are inferences made by human
>beings qua research objects (again, provided one is using the terms
>in their literal sense). Of course at a higher level of abstraction
>similarities between physics and linguistics get more pronounced,
>but this is a different matter.

Reply:

If it really is true that "it is customary to ridicule the idea that there
might be a clear distinction between study of human nature and study of
inanimate nature", then maybe a more constructive response would be, not
counter ridicule, but to give equal weight to similarities and differences
between humans and other species, on the one hand, and between life and nonlife
on the other.


Esa Itkonen wrote:

>Language cannot be adequately understood without the notion of
>normativity (= correct vs. incorrect or grammatical vs ungrammatical),
>and this is a necessarily social notion; but normativity is nearly
>ignored. This means in fact that functionalists (and cognitivists)
>are only too eager to commit the psychologistic fallacy
>(= reducing 'ought' to 'is', or ignoring 'ought' entirely).

Reply:

Then again, it might be argued that to claim that "Language cannot be
adequately understood without the notion of normativity (= correct vs.
incorrect or grammatical vs ungrammatical)" looks a little like Philosopher's
Syndrome: mistaking a failure of imagination for an insight into necessity.

Chris