intent

[Dan Parvaz]

> For example, Searle argues very convincingly that the notion of
> 'unconcious intention' is incoherent.

"Nonetheless, though not all conscious states are intentional, and not all
intentional states are conscious, there is an essential connection: we
only understand intentionality in terms of consciouness. There are many
intentional states that are not conscious, but they are the sort of thing
that could potentially be conscious." (Searle, _Mind, Language, and
Society_, p.65).

This seems to be an important clarification of your point, namely that the
NOTION of `unconscious intention' may be incoherent, even though
unconscious intention does in fact exist. This speaks to our
understanding, not the world of facts.

Cheers,

Dan.

____________
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. .   D A N  P A R V A Z  --  Geek-in-Residence
 U    University of New Mexico Linguistics Dept
 -    dparvaz@{unm.edu,lanl.gov}   505.480.9638