universals, innateness & Chomsky

[Tom Givon]

Dear FUNK people,

I keep changing my mind whether it would be useful to respond to
Alexander Gross' recent epistle. It was surely a spirited missive,
certainly most enjoyable. But how could one respond to a Credo ? (Except
by reciting a counter- Credo , which I am loathe to do). Perhaps rather
than responding directly, I will pick what seem to me the most salient
issues.

1. Reductionism: One of the least fortunate legacies of 20th Centrury
linguistics is the stark, either-or reductionism used to frame
theoretical (and factual...) issues. For the record, Chomsky was not the
first culprit. Bloomfield (1922, 1933), in his capacity as a flaming
behaviorist/empiricist, was quite adamant about making a forced choice
between Hermann Paul's "mentalism" and know-no-mind empiricism; or
between Paul's (and Humbold's) universalism and 100%  linguistic
relativity; or between (implicitly here) Platonic innateness and
true-blue Watsonian behaviorism. Chomsky (1959, 1966) of course reversed
directions, but was just as adamant about there being no middle grounds
between Skinner & Descartes. The facts of language learning, language
use and diachronic change, however, together with theoretical
considerations that go back to (at least) Kant, strongly suggest that
language is a typical biologically-based hybrid system; one that
accommodates both extremes as competing principles within a complex
system. As long as it keeps oscilating between the two reductive
extremes, linguistics is doomed to recapitulate the 23 centuries'
pendulum swings of post-Socrating epistemology. Which, for my money,
would be a bloomin' shame.

2. Universals, innateness and evolution: So far as I can tell, there has
been only two serious traditional explanation proposed for universals,
not only of language but also of mind and, indeed, of biological design:
(i) The Divine; (ii) Evolution. For the peculiar band of non-religious
relativists that sprang in academic linguistics and anthropology one
could concede a third one: (iii) Randomness. But, you surely agree, this
is not much of an explanation. So, if you are not inclined to invoked
either the Deity (i) or Randomess (iii) as serious scientific
explanations, and if you recognize at least some  universals of
language, you have no choice but to concede some  innatenes,
neurological specialization, genetic encoding--and evolution. You simply
can't buy one without buying the others. They come together, package
deal. Tho of course, you are entitled to quibble about (or let repeated
cycles of empirical investrigation settle, as I vastly prefer) matters
of degree & fine details.

3. Evolution of mind: What split the two co-discovered of
adaptive-selected evolution, Darwin and Wallace, from each other was the
ancient question of where to draw the line. Wallace argued that the body
evolved but the mind did not; essentially a dusted-up Platonic/Cartesian
dualist position. Darwin insisted that what's good for the body is also
good for the mind/soul; a position in line with Aristotelian monism in
biology.

One of the most puzzling things about Chomsky's approach to language is
that in spite of being an avowed innatist and an atheist, he resists
viewing language as the product of adaptive-selected evolution. In a
recent joint article (with Hauser and Fitch, in Science), this paradox
is maintained by invoking a (familiar?) distinction between the general
cognition that supports language (including semantics and preagmatics!),
which did evolve selectively-adaptively, and the presumably
non-adaptive, unique core-principle of human language--recursivity--
which cannot be explained adaptively. The supportive argument is cited
directly from Chomsky 1965--yes, you guessed it-- Performance ("general
cognition") vs. Competence ("the unique core-principle")! So Chomsky has
gone a considerable distance past Wallace, recognizing the evolution of
mind but not of language.

4. Linguistic relativism: The kind of linguistic/cultural  relativism
that Alexander Gross waxes so nostalgically about is rather familiar in
the social science (and the humanities), and is indeed the direct
intellectual descendant of Wallace's denial of the evolution of mind. It
is fully tantamount to saying that the brain evolved but the mind
didn't. Perhaps with one exception, tho--this position is advocated by
non-religious academics. But otherwise, it is part and parcel of the old
tradition of drawing a sharp line between the biological (corporeal,
profane, mundane; or subject to adaptive-selected evolution), and the
mental/cultural (divinely given or free-chosen and fancy free). And it
is Decartes' dualism thinly disguised, dusted up and refitted in fancy
(post-modern) lingo. But otherwise still recognoizable.

5. Chomsky as a convenient Devil: I come last to a peculiar obsession of
functionalist of whatever sect (or stripe), one they apparently--in a
way peculiarly remiscent of old-time religion--cannot do without. For
apparently we need a Devil; our very own Daemon to cast out; the
Scapegoat to lead to the altar. And Chomsky surely makes such a splendid
"Tailed One" (Kwasi-gyat , in Ute), being so obviously the font of all
intellectual evil. So, at the risk of heresy and excommunication, I
would like to suggest that in spite of all the profound and well
documented differences and disagreements, we owe poor Noam an awful lot.
For he had put many important issues back on the table that were ruled
out or obscured by the Bloomfieldians. And, above all, that we really
don't need a devil, be it Noam or anybody else. For we can learn even
from what we take to be his missteps, and then move on, unencumbered by
self-righteousness. Hey guys, let's do science. Let's unearth
interesting facts and look for systematic tho tentative but (hopefully)
progressively better explanations.

Have fun. Best,  TG