[ateliers] sémantique IHPST : 26 avril (rapp el) et 26 juin

Tue Apr 25 12:32:11 UTC 2006

De: "peggy.cardon" <peggy.cardon at univ-paris1.fr>

  Bonjour,

  Nous vous informons que deux ateliers de sémantique sont organisés par l'IHPST, sous la responsabilité de Friederike Moltmann :

  - Mercredi 26 avril, workshop "Issues in the Semantics of Anaphora"

  - Lundi 26 juin, workshop "Meaning, Value, and Relative Truth"

  Veuillez trouver ci-après les programmes de ces deux ateliers.

  Bien cordialement,
  Peggy Cardon

  **********************************************

  Issues in the Semantics of Anaphora

  Wednesday, April 26, 2006

  IHPST / GDR Sémantique et Modélisation
  Location: IHPST, 13 rue due Four, 75006 Paris
  Metro: Mabillon

  Morning Session

  Chair: Claire Beyssade (Institut Jean Nicod)
  10.00-11.15: Francis Corblin (Paris IV/Institut Jean Nicod): Pronouns 
  as Echos of Mentions
  11.15-11.30: coffee break
  11.30-12.45: Daniel Hardt (Copenhagen Business School): Minimizing 
  Computation in Ellipsis Interpretation

  12.45-14.00: lunch break

  Afternoon Session

  Chair: Jacqueline Guéron (Paris III)
  14.00-15.15: Friederike Moltmann (IHPST): Anaphora in 
  First-Person-Oriented Generic
                       Contexts
  15.15-16.30: Nicholas Asher (IRIT (Toulouse)): Troubles on the Right Frontier
  16.30.-16.45: Coffee Break
  16.45-18.00: Gabriel Sandu (IHPST): Functional Anaphora

  Abstracts:

  1. Francis Corblin: Anaphora as Echos of Mentions
  Research in the last decades in semantics has tried to establish, for 
  some restricted pronominal paradigms, that pronouns have a core 
  meaning. Evans (1980) claims that there are few (somewhat) related 
  models for pronouns, and Kamp (1981) develops a formalism giving a 
  unified meaning to pronouns in general.
        In this paper, I will focus on French "personal" pronouns il, 
  elle, le, lui, en, y , and I will discuss some data difficult to 
  accommodate in the classical Evans/Kamp models :a) Some varieties of 
  pay-check sentences ; b) anaphora by pronouns to parts of idioms; c) 
  revision sentences as discussed by Strawson (1952).
        I will argue that this range of cases points to a unified theory 
  of pronouns seen as "echos of mentions", a mention being a discourse 
  event involving the use of a linguistic expression of a certain kind. 
  I try to make explicit in the talk what is metaphorically meant by the 
  term "echo" in the above formulation.

  2. Daniel Hardt: Minimizing Computation in Ellipsis Interpretation
  Elliptical expressions require the hearer to compute an interpretation 
  in the absence of overt structure. This might seem an impossible task, 
  especially given that the hearer must apparently compute inferences to 
  determine the missing material that the speaker had in mind.  In this 
  talk, I will make two proposals to limit the computation required for 
  ellipsis interpretation.  The first is monotonicity: elided or 
  otherwise backgrounded expressions are
  integrated as soon as possible into the evolving model of discourse. 
  The second is inference triggering: inference is performed only when 
  triggered by violations of semantically relevant conditions.  I will 
  argue that these restrictions explain a range of otherwise puzzling 
  observations concerning VP ellipsis and sluicing.  Finally, I will 
  suggest a unification of ellipsis interpretation with the general 
  interpretation of backgrounded material in discourse.

  3. Friederike Moltmann: Anaphora in First-Person-Oriented Generic Contexts
  This talk explores the consequences of the little studied 
  'first-person-oriented' generic pronoun one with its empty counterpart 
  'arbitrary PRO' for a general theory of anaphora. As I argued in 
  Moltmann (to appear b), generic one is 'first person-oriented' in that 
  it leads to an expression of genericity driven either by an inference 
  from the first person (the relevant agent) as in (1a) or by an 
  intended inference to the first person as in (1b):
  (1) a. One can see the picture from the entrance.
         b. One must submit the abstract by tomorrow.
  Generic one seems at first to act either like an indefinite or an 
  unbound anaphoric pronoun in 'donkey'-sentences such as, apparently, 
  (2), with the former binding the latter outside its scope (a 
  bound-variable occurrence, assuming a variable-, rather than an E-type 
  account of unbound anaphoric pronouns, as recently defended in 
  Moltmann, to appear a):
  (2) If one has a car, one can drive to work.
  However, a closer investigation reveals that all occurrences of 
  generic one, as well as arbitrary PRO must be bound by a sentential 
  generic operator. Yet a clear distinction needs to be made between 
  bound-variable occurrences of generic one and occurrences with a 
  genuine first-person-oriented content. I will explore the 
  ramifications of two general ideas pursued recently especially by 
  Kratzer, namely (1) that indefinites / pronouns, to a great extent, 
  are tied to sentential operators and (2) that pronouns in general 
  alternate between occurrences with interpreted features and 
  occurrences that are empty at Logical Form, occurrences which are 
  interpreted as bound variables. The results will be extended to 
  indefinites and unbound anaphoric pronouns in generic contexts in 
  general.
  Moltmann, F; (to appear a): 'E-type, Dynamic, and Structured 
  Propositions Approaches to
        Unbound Anaphoroic Pronouns'. Synthese. Available at:
        http://www-ihpst.univ-paris1.fr/fmoltmann
  ----------------- (to appear b): 'Generic One, Arbitrary PRO, and the 
  First Person'; Natural
        Language Semantics. Available at: 
  http://www-ihpst.univ-paris1.fr/fmoltmann

  4. Nicholas Asher: Troubles on the Right Frontier
  Anaphors in natural language are subject to several constraints 
  governing their possible antecedents.  While syntactic and semantic 
  constraints of the sort discussed in generative syntax and dynamic 
  semantics respectively, discourse constraints on anaphora are less 
  well known at least in the philosophical community.  The Right 
  Frontier Constraint, originally proposed by Polanyi in the eighties, 
  is one of the central constraints on discourse update and anaphora 
  resolution in SDRT, an extension of dynamic semantics that takes 
  rhetorical relations and discourse structure into account.  In this 
  paper I will first set out this constraint, then look at some evidence 
  and finally some challenges to this constraint.  The evidence for and 
  against leads us to distinguish between different types of anaphoric 
  expressions based not only on the type of object they refer to but 
  also with respect to what sorts of presuppositional content they have. 
    I'll argue for two basic observations: anaphors referring to 
  abstract entities like propositions in general obey the right frontier 
  constraint without exception.  Secondly, anaphors referring to 
  concrete entities introduced by noun phrases in previous discourse 
  have a complex behavior.  In general expressions with a 'heavier' 
  presuppositional content (definite descriptions and complex 
  demonstratives) have a better chance of remaining felicitous even 
  though the relations between them and their antecedents violate the 
  Right Frontier Constraint.  I will then give an explanation of this 
  contrast in terms of the individuation conditions of propositions and 
  other abstract entities as opposed to concrete entities.  Roughly, the 
  Right Frontier constraint is constitutive of the abstract entities 
  that a text speaks about, whereas this is not the case for concrete 
  entities. The Right Frontier Constraint seems to be more a matter of 
  presentation, salience or information packaging when reference to 
  concrete entities is concerned.

  5. Gabriel Sandu: Functional Anaphora
  The purpose of the paper is to analyze cases of discourse (unbound) 
  anaphora which involve a co-variation between a pronoun and its 
  "head". The data include extensional contexts like
  (1) Every child received a present. John opened it immediately.
  (2) Every merchandize has a prize. For meet it is 10 euros.
  (3) Every child received a present. Some child opened it immediately.
  (4) Every merchandize has a prize. For some merchandise, it is 10 euros.
  as well as intensional ones (Hob-Nob sentences)
  (5) Mary thinks that somebody broke into the house. She believes that 
  he stole the silver.
  (6) Hob thinks that a witch has blighted Bob.s mare. Nob thinks that 
  she has killed Bob.s sow.
  In all these examples, the semantic value of the definite pronoun 
  co-varies with that of its "head". We shall spell out the kind of 
  co-variation involved here in terms of functional dependence. For 
  instance, the first sentences in (1) and (2) introduce a functional 
  dependence in the relevant universe "xR(x; fx)  and  "xP(x; fx) , 
  while in the second sentence, the function so introduced is re-applied 
  to an individual in its domain "xR(x; fx);O(j; fj) and   "xP(x; fx); 
  f(m) = 10 . (Here the colon is treated as dynamic conjunction.)
        (3) and (4) are slightly more involved, but the mechanism is 
  basically the same:
  "xR(x; fx); $yO(y; fy)  and "xP(x; fx); $yf(y) = 10 .
  Treating propositional attitudes as universal quantifiers over 
  epistemic states, and indefinite noun phrases as existential 
  quantifiers, we notice that the logical forms of (5) and (6) exhibit a 
  similar mechanism: the functional dependence introduced in the first 
  sentence is exploited in the second one: $W(w)(f(w)); $w'E(w')(f(w)) . 
  Here the first universal quantifier may be taken to range over the 
  epistemic states of Hob, and the second over those of Nob. The dynamic 
  conjunction has the property of letting $w bind the free occurrence of 
  w in the second formula. W(w)(f(w)) abbreviates "f(w) satisfies the 
  predicate W in the state w". In the full paper the functional 
  interpretation will be shown to be one of the applications of 
  game-theoretical semantics. I will also undertake a comparison with 
  other treatments (DRT, Dynamic logic, E-type pronouns, Moltmann).

  **********************************************************

  Workshop

  Meaning, Value, and Relative Truth

  Monday, June 26, 2006

  Institut d'Histoire et de Philosophie de Sciences et Techniques
  Location TBA

  Morning Session

  Chair: Jacques Dubucs (IHPST)
  10.00-11.15: Robert Stalnaker (MIT): The New Relativism
  11.15-11.30: coffee break
  11.30-12.45: Kevin Mulligan (Geneva): The Language of Value

  12.45-14.00: lunch break

  Afternoon Session

  Chair: Pierre Jacob (Institut Jean Nicod)
  14.00-15.15: Paul Boghossian (NYU): What is Relativism?
  15.15-16.30: Friederike Moltmann (IHPST): Relative Truth and the First Person
  16.30.-16.45: Coffee Break
  16.45-18.00: Adam Sennet (Rutgers, UC Davis): On Recent Arguments 
  Concerning the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction

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