In Kosovo, appearances deceive

[Harold F. Schiffman]

from the November 30, 2007 edition -
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1130/p08s01-comv.html

In Kosovo, appearances deceive

There is less reason to be alarmed over pending Kosovo independence than
at first seems the case. Two years of talks over Kosovo's future have
ended in failure. As a result, the province is expected to soon declare
independence from Serbia over loud Serb and Russian objections, and amid
concern of renewed violence in the Balkans. But there is less cause for
alarm than appears.

One reason is the passage of time. The pending loss of Kosovo will bring
howls from Serbia, which considers the province of mostly ethnic Albanians
to be the cradle of Serb civilization. But Serbia has not been able to
exercise authority over Kosovo since 1999, when NATO's air war freed it
from a harsh Serb crackdown on Albanian dissent. Since then, Kosovo has
been administered by the United Nations, its security guaranteed by
thousands of NATO forces.

After eight years of separation, the parties must now realize that the 90
percent of Kosovo that is made up of ethnic Albanians simply will not
accept rule by Serbia. Neither is continued legal limbo advisable for an
area so devastatingly poor. Kosovo can't attract investment when its
future is uncertain.

Even so, what's likely to emerge will still not be full-fledged
independence. Kosovo will call it that, of course. But the European Union
sees it as "conditional independence," a diplomatic fudging that also
allows Serbia to claim that Kosovo won't really be sovereign.

Almost all EU countries and the United States are expected to recognize a
Kosovo government in Pristina, but only if it passes into law protections
for its Serb minority and allows international supervision of the Serb
community  to which it has agreed.

Meanwhile, what has been a de facto UN protectorate will become for some
time a de facto protectorate of the EU, which will take over police
training and assist economically (NATO will still protect it from external
threats). Kosovo won't have a UN seat  yet  but it will have much more
self-governance.

Each side has incentives to move on and avoid violence. First, Kosovo
Albanians crave international recognition and are unlikely to endanger it
by repeating, for instance, a 2004 rampage on Kosovo Serbs.

Serbia says it has no plans to intervene militarily, for instance, to
forcibly take northern Kosovo, where most of the 200,000 ethnic Serbs
live. It well remembers NATO's power. Besides, northern Kosovo is so
influenced and supported by Serbia, that the area's close ties to Belgrade
are unlikely to change anytime soon. And Serbia still has its eye on EU
membership. Its young people, too, are clamoring for jobs. More war, more
violence, are not the way to get either. Serbia recognized this when it
prevented Serb paramilitaries from gathering near the Kosovo border this
week.

Lastly, there's reason to believe that Russia's bluster on Kosovo is
largely bluff. It's siding with its Slavic ally, Serbia, but Moscow has
little interest in Kosovo itself. Russia's threats to link Kosovo's
sovereignty issue to two breakaway regions in Georgia run the risk of
rebellion on Russia's flanks.

As the weeks unfold, violence could flare in and around Kosovo. NATO must
be ready. But the world might find that self-declared independence, after
failed negotiations, saves face for the Serbs, who have not had to
publicly agree to independence. It can move both Kosovo and Serbia closer
to Europe, to deeper democracy and growth.

Full HTML version of this story which may include photos, graphics, and
related links

http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1130/p08s01-comv.html

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