[lg policy] Minority education policy of China with reference to Tibet

[Harold Schiffman]

Minority education policy of China with reference to
Tibet<http://www.merabsarpa.com/education/minority-education-policy-of-china-with-reference-to-tibet>
Posted on January 31,
2012<http://www.merabsarpa.com/education/minority-education-policy-of-china-with-reference-to-tibet>
by Kalsang Wangdu <http://www.merabsarpa.com/author/kalsangwangdue>

*Introduction*

>>From October 19 to 25, 2010, thousands of Tibetan students from six schools
in Qinghai Tibetan region (the only ethnic Tibetan region that still uses
the Tibetan language medium beyond primary school) staged peaceful protests
against the government plan to enforce Mandarin as the medium of
instruction by 2015, bringing to the fore China’s problematic minority
educational policy.  They have raised the issues of cultural autonomy and
cultural assimilation in China, and demonstrate the role education plays in
cultural reproduction.  China is a multiethnic nation with 56 officially
recognized ethnic nationalities.  Of the total population, the dominant Han
nationality comprises 91.59% and the remaining 55 ethnic minorities totaled
around 108.46 million or 8.98% (National Bureau of Statistics of China,
2001, p. 100).  In the last six decades of communist rule, the government’s
linguistic policy has led to perhaps the greatest language shift and loss
in the world (Zhou, 2000).  In larger discourse on the relationship between
the Chinese government and minority groups, educational policy in general
and language policy in particular is one of the core issues of conflict.
This paper critically examines the Chinese government’s rhetorical
discourses on minority education by looking at the current state of
education in Tibet, and focuses on school education in terms of the Tibetan
language and cultural components of the curriculum against the backdrop of
constitutional and legal provisions.
 <http://www.merabsarpa.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/stu_protest11.jpg>

Tibetan students' protest, Amdo Tibet, October 2010.

*Constitutional provisions for minority education: *

* *China took control of Tibet in 1950, and initially followed a gradualist
approach to transform Tibetan society.  The 17th Point Agreement signed
between the Tibetan and Chinese governments in May 1951 states that “the
spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan nationality
shall be developed step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in
Tibet” (Bass, 1998).  This agreement became the basis of China’s rule in
Tibet.  More importantly, in the Common Program of the Constitution of the
Peoples’ Republic of China promulgated in 1949, Article 50 recognized
equality of all ethnic groups.  Similarly, Article 53 in particular states
that every minority group has the freedom to use and develop its language
and to maintain its customs and religion (Zhou, 2004).  In 1984, the Act of
Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities became effective in which Articles
9 and 10 gave ethnic minorities the right to use and develop their own
language and the freedom to believe in religion (Information Office of the
State Council, 2005).  Likewise, to cater to the varying needs of a large
number of ethnic groups in China, Article 12 of the Chinese Education law
of 1995 also stipulates that the “schools and other educational
institutions primarily for ‘minority’ nationalities may use the spoken or
written language in common use among ethnic group or in the locality as the
language of instruction” (National People’s Congress, 1995).

Tibet is the most backward region of China in terms of economic development
and level of educational attainment.  In order to uplift the state of
education, the government adopted many so-called preferential policies and
spent a huge amount of money, especially after the 1980s. These policies
included *sanbao* or the ‘three guarantees policy’ of providing free food,
clothing and lodging for children at school starting from 1984; inland
secondary classes and schools for Tibetan primary graduates called *neidi
xizang ban* policy in 1985; bilingual education; ethnic minority teacher
training, etc. There is no denying the fact that Tibet experienced
substantial economic and educational development in the last few decades.
But the growth and development has seldom benefited the ethnic Tibetan
people. Andrew M. Fischer (2005) calls it ‘exclusionary growth’, which has
resulted in further alienation of the Tibetans in Tibet.  Opportunities
presented by modernization in Tibet are being availed by millions of
Chinese migrants, and Tibetans find themselves increasingly left out from
the exploits.

*Current practices*

*Status of Tibetan language: *Tibetan language is the medium of
communication of Tibetan culture, and thus, assumes outmost significance in
terms of cultural reproduction and continuation of the ethnicity.  However,
despite constitutional provisions, the teaching of the Tibetan language has
been neglected in varying degrees.  During the Cultural Revolution
(1966-1976), the Tibetan language was categorized among the “Four Olds” and
became a target of attack and was simply “outlawed for several years”
(Tournadre, 2003b).  In 1980s, however, there was considerable cultural
revival as result of support from General Secretary of the Communist Party
of China Hu Yaobang and the Party Secretary Wu Jinhua. With the insistence
of Panchen Lama and Ngapo, two leading Tibetan cadres, plans were drawn to
make Tibetan the language of administration and education.  However, this
trend was quickly reversed in mid-1990s following Tibetan uprisings and
Chinese pro-democracy movements in the late 1980s, and with the breakup of
the former Soviet Union.  The Communist Party felt that its power was
directly under threat, and it heralded the return to hardline policies. In
Tibet, the Chinese government made deliberate attempts to link Tibetan
language and culture with ethnic nationalism.  Thus, Tibetan language and
culture came under severe attack under the leadership of hardliners such as
TAR Party Secretary Chen Kuiyuan (1992-2000).  This resulted in a creation
of an atmosphere where it has made it difficult for Tibetans to assert
their linguistic and cultural rights as enshrined in the constitution.
Tibetans live in perpetual fear of being accused as ‘splittist’, the
highest political crime, if they advocate for Tibetan language education
(Woeser, 2010).

However, it is difficult to generalize about a region as wide as Tibet
covering almost one-fourth of China.  But in general, except in the Qinghai
Tibetan region, the Tibetan language medium is used only up to the primary
level. Almost all the secondary schools use Mandarin Chinese as the medium
of instruction and Tibetan language is either dropped or retained as an
elective subject.  In Qinghai Tibetan regions, some Tibetan secondary
schools still use the Tibetan medium to a varying degrees – some secondary
schools teach Tibetan, history, geography and math in Tibetan language, but
teach physics, chemistry and biology in Chinese medium. This generalization
is only representative and not exhaustive.

*Negative representation of Tibetan culture and religion: *Tibetan schools
also follow the Chinese national curriculum developed in far-away Beijing
and thus, cultural exclusion is acutely felt in all regions of Tibet.  The
treatment of the Tibetan culture and religion in the school curriculum
reflects the prevailing political mood of the government.  However, except
for a short period from the early 1980s to early 1990s, Tibetan culture and
religion has been denigrated to varying degrees. The civilizing mission of
state education often described ethnic minority culture as backward (Ch. *
luolou*).  The very conception of ‘minority education’ (Ch*. minzu jiaoyu) *as
different from ‘regular education’ (Ch. *zhenggui jiaoyu*), is based on the
idea of fostering allegiance towards the state and ensuring stability as
the primary goal of education for minorities.  This means that minorities
need to unlearn aspects of their culture that the government describes as
‘unpatriotic’ and ‘elitist’ (Bass, 1998).  Hence, the Tibetan culture,
language and religion often fall into these categories.  These attempts by
the Chinese government correspond to what Cruikshank (1999) called as the
need to create and arm the ‘enemy’ so as to engage in conflict and justify
the system that is meant to exercise social control and governance.

* *

*Ideological and patriotic education: *Ideological and patriotic education
is an important component of the Chinese state’s discourse on education for
minorities, and is meant to supplement the exclusion of Tibetan culture in
the school curriculum.   As such, elements of patriotic education have made
significant inroads into the school curriculum. In the case of Tibet,
patriotic education assumes the role of legitimizing communist rule and
negating pre-1950 Tibet. Ideological and political correctness became an
important yardstick for selection of students for educational
opportunities. One of the pre-conditions for getting the three guarantees
of free food, clothing and housing is “good ideological and moral
character” (Zhiyong, 2008, p. 45). Likewise for the selection of Tibetan
students for inland secondary classes and schools, the fourth condition is
maintenance of “state ideology and morality” (Zhiyong, 2007, p. 76). Not
surprisingly then, school subjects like history and language carry strong
undercurrents of ideological messages.  Even in seemingly apolitical
subjects like math, Dawa Norbu (1997) wrote that the Chinese teacher would
give a word problem example such as: “I have five eggs. I offer three to
the People’s Liberation Army. How many have I left?”

Moreover, under Chen Kuiyuan, patriotic education was started in Tibetan
schools in 1992 and later extended to the society at large. It has involved
raising the Chinese national flag, singing the Chinese national anthem, and
studying books and films approved by the authorities (Tibetan Centre for
Human Rights and Democracy, 2004).  As a part of the patriotic education
campaign, Tibetan students had to answer questions like these in the test:
“How can Tibet become a powerful and wealthy nation? And the options given
were a) continuation of the leadership of the Communist Party, b)
Independence (Bass, 1998, p. 58).” Failure to exhibit required patriotic
and ideological brand would mean punishment and even imprisonment (Bass,
2005). After the 2008 Tibetan uprisings, patriotic education was further
stepped up in schools and monasteries.

*Analysis of the discourses on education in Tibet*

*Discourse versus reality: *In the government discourses such as the *White
Paper* (Information Office of the State Council, 2008), statistical data
about education in Tibet gave highly inflated figures such as a literacy
rate of 95% and an enrollment rate for school age children as 98.2%.  But
the reality speaks quite a different story.  According to Baden Nima
(2008), around 40-60% of Tibetan children do not attend school at all and
the literacy rate by the turn of the last century stood woefully low at
about 50%.  In the Tibet Autonomous Region, less than 25% of Tibetan
children graduate to secondary school (Postiglione, 2004), and in rural
areas where 80% of Tibetans live, the primary schools at best provide only
three years of schooling (Bass, 2008).  Therefore, scholars generally tend
to question the credibility of government data and treat them as more of
propaganda.

Perspectives from government discourse mainly attribute the low school
enrollment and high dropout rates in Tibet as result of the backwardness
and illiteracy of parents in rural and nomadic Tibet (Bass, 2005).  This is
deceptive, although it is quite understandable that in rural and nomadic
Tibet, illiterate parents might want to keep their children at home for
work.  John U. Ogbu (1978) has postulated the theory of ‘voluntary’ and
‘involuntary minority’.  According to him, ‘voluntary minorities’ are those
people who became minority as they migrated out of choice, and hence they
are more receptive to mainstream culture. Whereas ‘involuntary minorities’
are indigenous people who have become a minority in their own land due to
the migration of other groups., They tend to develop an‘oppositional
identity’ in the face of pressure from a dominant culture.  The author’s
theory could offer another perspective to the low attendance, as many
parents in Tibet have not and still do not see any meaning in the state
school education due to its cultural irrelevance.  Values transmitted by
state schooling are seen as alien or even anathema to the cultural values
of the Tibetans (Bangsbo, 2008).  Zhu Zhiyong (2008, p. 49) conducted a
survey in the Nagchu district of Tibet and found that “the school in its
current state has a negative effect on the herdsmen’s families’ conception
of education”.  The mere fact that many rural and nomadic families send
their children to India buttresses Ogbu’s theory.  Due to a lack of
educational opportunities and cultural irrelevance of whatever is
available, many parents in Tibet had to seek an alternative source of
education for their children by taking the risk of sending them to India.
According to the Tibetan Refugee Reception Centre in Dharamsala, of 43,634
Tibetans who fled Tibet and came to India between 1991 to June 2004, 60%
are below the age of 25 (cited in Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and
Democarcy, 2004).  Tibetan Children’s Village schools in India alone
received around 14,000 Tibetan children from 1980 to 2010 (Yeshi, 2010).
Lack of culturally relevant education and religious freedom are the two
primary reasons for this massive exodus of Tibetans for the last four
decades.  It is also clearly evident that the Chinese medium of instruction
in the secondary schools has put ethnic minorities at a great disadvantage,
and adversely affects their educational enrollment and attainment (Hong,
2010).

*Inland secondary schools for Tibetans: *In 1985, Chinese government
started the practice of sending a large number of Tibetan primary school
graduates to inland secondary schools (Ch. *neidi xizang ban policy)* in 19
provinces outside Tibetan regions under the banner of an ‘intellectual aid
scheme’ (Ch. *zhili yuanzang*).  From 1985 to 2001, around 23,560 Tibetan
primary school graduates attended these inland schools (Postiglione et al.,
2004).  Around one third of Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) students who
enter secondary education attend these inland classes and schools (Bass,
2005), and one can assume that they comprise a high percentage of Tibet’s
top ranking primary graduates (Postiglione, 2008).  Government discourses
dwell heavily on the success of this policy and commend the benevolence of
the Central government and the inland provinces (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2000: China Tibet Information Center, 2010).  This practice was
later extended to Uyghur Muslims also. It is indeed quite spectacular that
the inland provinces would provide such educational aids to Tibetan
students. However, this policy must be seen in the light of what Cruikshank
(1999) called as “technologies of citizenship” that seeks to constitute and
regulate citizens, and entail power relations that are both voluntary and
coercive.

Tibet’s remoteness, lack of infrastructure, and difficulties in getting
qualified teachers are important factors in justifying inland secondary
schools for Tibetan, but a closer look at the kind of education that
Tibetan students are receiving in these dislocated secondary classes and
schools reveal well-intended attempts at assimilation.  For example, in a
week, out of 34-43 periods they attend depending upon their grade level,
only 4-5 periods cover Tibetan language and rest of the curriculum is
identical to mainstream Chinese schools (Zhu, 2007).  These students are
also subjected to ideological and moral education classes.  Similarly, by
rule these students, aged between 12-14 years at the time of selection,
cannot return to Tibet even during vacation until they complete four-years
of junior secondary school.  By virtue of their isolation, they cannot
attend any religious activities or pray at monasteries (Postiglione et al.,
2004). The overall effect on identity formation is difficult to say, as in
many cases, dislocation often heightens ethnic consciousness. However, by
the time they return to Tibet after seven years of isolation, these
secondary graduates are generally bereft of their culture. Around half of
them become teachers (Postiglione, 2009), and thus perpetuate the current
state of education that gives primacy to the Mandarin Chinese and Han
culture.

*Linguistic and cultural education – Discourses and realities: *The Chinese
government discourses on minority languages are ambiguous and present a
conflicting dichotomy between what is being written and what is being
done.  The themes of protection and preservation of Tibetan language are
persistent in all major government publications on Tibetan education
(Aiming, 2004; Information Office of the State Council, 2000 & 2008).
However, since the late 1990s the promotion of Mandarin became an important
national agenda and as a result, the Tibetan language has become
increasingly marginalized.  Apart from the cultural capital theory, another
reason advanced in the government discourse on language issue is the
preeminence of economic determinism.  As recent as September 2010, Qinghai
provincial secretary Qiang Wei (2010) spoke at a conference of education
and maintained that promotion of the common speech (Mandarin Chinese) is
important from an economic point of view.  But the economic primacy of
Mandarin Chinese is due largely to the political factor of denying
political and socio-economic expanse for minority languages to operate.

Another issue of disagreement is over the inclusion of minority culture in
the school education.  The government publications and discourses are also
somewhat pretentious (Aiming, 2004; Information Office of the State
Council, 2008).  These publications extol Tibet’s ‘splendid culture’ and
‘long history’, and discuss in length about government’s effort to preserve
and protect them.  But on the practical level many aspects of Tibetan
culture are being denigrated as backward and unpatriotic (Bass, 2005).  As
such cultural education for Tibetan is substituted by ideological and
patriotic education that endorses Han Chinese culture.  Tibetan Buddhism is
neglected from the school curriculum.  References to Tibetan history mostly
emphasize the alleged benevolence that China has shown to Tibet throughout
history and how Tibet is an inalienable part of China.  Even stories in the
Tibetan language textbooks are mostly translation of stories about
communist heroes and seldom reflect socio-cultural and environmental milieu
of the child (Bass, 2008).  This has led to what Harrel (cited in Bass,
2005) called ‘stigmatized identity’.  Even the Han Chinese students are
being taught that Tibet is a backward and barbaric region.  As a result,
according to the famous Chinese writer Wang Lixiong, many Han Chinese
possess negative attitudes towards Tibetans, and always look down upon them
from a position of superiority (as cited in Sarin & Sonam, 2009).

The Chinese government uses education as a powerful “technology of
citizenship” that  legitimizes communist rule and produces loyal citizens.
However, the Government’s ‘benevolent’ attempts at acculturating ‘backward’
minorities through education is itself a relation of powers, as the
government cannot speak in the voice of the voiceless minorities without
first constituting their inability to speak for themselves (Cruikshank,
1999).
 <http://www.merabsarpa.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/edu-tibet3.jpg>

"I am a child of China, I like to speak Mandarin". A school gate in Tibet.
Courtesy: Woeser (2010)

*What led to the non-implementation of the constitutional provisions?: *The
tremendous gap between educational rights and policies enshrined in the
constitutional legislation and the actual practice is perceptible to a most
casual observer.  There is no doubt that the economic poverty and
geographical isolation and remoteness of Tibet is a major factor hindering
the realization of the constitutional provisions.  Lack of bilingual
teachers is also another factor.  However, the main reason is lack of
political will on the side of Chinese government to genuinely pursue a
culturally and linguistically relevant education in minority areas
including Tibet.  The government’s interest is served by merely including
these provisions in the constitution as it helps the government look modern
and can lessen international criticisms on fundamental theoretical level.

Minglang Zhou (2004) proffers three main reasons for this apparent gap
between China’s minority educational policy and practice.  First, most of
the communist states always promise more than what they are willing to
deliver.  Second, in Leninist-Stalinist theory the accommodation of ethnic
and linguistic diversity is only a means to ultimate integration.  Third,
Han chauvinism always makes implementation of minority constitutional
rights difficult.  Baden Nima (2008) and Woeser (2010) also wrote that
local Han cadres often belittle effort to educate Tibetan in their own
language.  However, this has not done any good to the national integration
either.  Events of 2008 and 2009 in Tibet and Uyghur minority areas have
sufficiently shown the growing social gap between Han and minority groups.

*Conclusion*

*Genuine bilingual education rooted in minority culture: *In *The Will to
Empower*, Cruikshank (1999) questions and analyzes power relationships and
asserts that in spite of the emancipatory claim of those who seek to
empower others, the relations of empowerment are themselves relations of
power.  This seems to be case with China’s attempts to empower its
minorities, although here the government’s intention is dubious.  In
Chinese government discourse, education to the minorities in Mandarin and
Han Chinese culture represents an attempt to empower the minorities and
bring economic and educational development to ethnic minority regions.
Yet, from the minorities’ perspective, it has clear disempowering effects,
as the educational displacement causes low school enrollment and erosion of
their language and culture.

One of the central issues in the discourse on minority education is
national unity and stability. In the case of Tibet, the government
establishes a link between Tibetan Buddhism and language with local ethnic
nationalism. Thus, deliberate attempts were made to exclude Tibetan
culture, including religion and language from education. However,
government efforts have not diminished ethnic nationalism, but rather
increased alienation and created sense of exclusion. It is quite evident
from the Tibetan and Uyghur experiences that the cultural exclusion,
ideological education and mainstreaming seldom results in national
integration. On the contrary, it has led to protests and unrest that
threaten national unity. Uprisings in Tibet and Uyghur area in 2008 and
2009 respectively, and Tibetan students’ protests in 2010 are cases in
point.  A more culturally oriented education could in fact bring the
minorities closer to the Chinese nation and promote unity in diversity.
Beijing must recognize that the child’s community and local milieu form the
primary social context in which learning takes place, and in which
knowledge acquires its meaning.

Thus, a genuine bilingual education rooted in minority culture could be the
true panacea for China’s minority educational problem.  In the case of
Tibet, Tibetan language should be promoted as the first language. Along
with that, it is important to create economic and political expanse for
Tibetan language to gain functional utility. This entails making Tibetan
language the language of administration and commerce. Without the prospect
of political and socio-economic gains and opportunities, even the choice
for an education in Tibetan language would be a ‘false choice’ (Zhou &
Ross, 2004).  The current version of bilingual education can at best be
described as ‘subtractive bilingualism’ (Fillmore, 1991) when learning a
second language means losing the first.  At the same time, there is ample
evidence to show that the ethnic minorities fully recognize the importance
of learning Mandarin Chinese (Anaytulla, 2008, Nima, 2008, Ojijed, 2010).
Julkunen (2001) explained three main motivations for learning a second
language, namely integrative, instrumental, and cognitive. Minorities in
China possessed strong instrumental motivation for learning Mandarin
Chinese such as prospects for getting good job, educational opportunities
and so on. Thus even in a system of a bilingual education rooted primarily
in minority language, the Mandarin Chinese will naturally gain a high
place, almost at par with the first language due to economic and
demographic reasons.  So, the fears of minority groups not being conversant
in Mandarin Chinese can be kept at bay.  Consequently, a bilingual
education rooted in minority language and more culturally relevant
education seems the best option for both Beijing and its ethnic minorities.

Therefore, adequate protection and promotion of Tibetan language and
culture through education is crucial to enhancing educational achievements
of Tibetan students, reducing the current level of unemployment, promoting
social development, and achieving national unity and stability. It would be
pertinent to sum up this paper in the words of eminent linguist Nicolas
Tournadre who wrote that the “Tibetan is one of the four oldest and
greatest in volume and most original literatures of Asia, along with
Sanskrit, Chinese, and Japanese literatures. So, that is a very good reason
for the heritage of humanity to keep this culture” (2003a, p. 2).  Even in
the most democratic and well-intentioned will to empower others, in this
case through education for minorities, Cruikshank (1999) calls to our
attention that there is the possibility of both freedom and domination.

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