16.3073, Review: Philosophy of La ng/Cognitive Science:Kert ész(2004)

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Subject: 16.3073, Review: Philosophy of Lang/Cognitive Science:Kertész(2004)

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1)
Date: 24-Oct-2005
From: Vanja Kljajevic < vanja_kljajev at yahoo.com >
Subject: Cognitive Semantics and Scientific Knowledge 

	
-------------------------Message 1 ---------------------------------- 
Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2005 02:32:16
From: Vanja Kljajevic < vanja_kljajev at yahoo.com >
Subject: Cognitive Semantics and Scientific Knowledge 
 

AUTHOR: Kertész, András 
TITLE: Cognitive Semantics and Scientific Knowledge 
SUBTITLE: Case studies in the cognitive science of science 
SERIES: Converging Evidence in Language and Communication Research 4 
PUBLISHER: John Benjamins 
YEAR: 2004
Announced at http://linguistlist.org/issues/15/15-1524.html 

Vanja Kljajevic, Institute of Cognitive Science, Carleton University, 
Ottawa, Canada

András Kertész's book "Cognitive Semantics and Scientific Knowledge" is an 
attempt to answer the question "How should we analyze scientific 
knowledge?". Although the book is organized in a way that brings cognitive 
semantics in focus, it actually addresses the problem that neither 
traditional analytic philosophy nor more recently developed naturalized 
philosophy of science based on behavioral psychology can explain some 
basic questions pertaining to scientific knowledge. As a solution, Kertész 
proposes to develop 'cognitive science of science' -- i.e. a version of 
the naturalized philosophy of science which would be based on linguistics 
as one of the disciplines that constitute cognitive science. More 
specifically, Kertész chooses to apply the methods of cognitive semantics, 
i.e. the cognitive theory of metaphor and the two-level approach to 
meaning to the domain of scientific knowledge. This choice is based on an 
assumption that not only psychology, but other disciplines contributing to 
cognitive science (e.g. linguistics) as well as their sub-disciplines 
(cognitive semantics) can borrow their methodology to philosophy of 
science. 

By narrowing down a more general question "What the case would be if the 
methods of cognitive semantics were applied to scientific knowledge?" to a 
few specific hypotheses and research questions carefully formulated in 
terms of the scope of the two cognitive semantics theories, Kertész 
addresses this main question at different levels in each of the four parts 
of the book. In the first part, 'Preliminaries', we find that Kertész's 
approach was inspired by cognitivism on one side, and the naturalized 
philosophy, on the other. Cognitivism postulates that certain behaviors 
(e.g. language) can be explained only by appeal to 'internal cognitive 
processes'. These internal processes consist of mental representations of 
information and a finite set of rules that operate on them. The mind's 
capacity to automatically receive, store, manipulate, and output 
INFORMATION depends on its receiving, storing, manipulating and outputting 
REPRESENTATIONS of that information (Von Eckardt 1995). 

Note that cognitivism is still a theory of COGNITIVE states and processes, 
yet to learn how to tackle phenomena such as understanding, sensations, 
emotions, moods, skills, consciousness, or creativity. The concept of 
understanding is particularly elusive, because it exhibits different 
paradigms, such as 'insightful understanding' in science (Haugeland 1998), 
which differs from our understanding of the world we live in, which in 
turn differs from our capacity to understand language. Since the purpose 
of scientific endeavor is to understand phenomena, it is interesting to 
observe the efforts to determine to what extent cognitivism, which cannot 
fully grasp the process of understanding, can contribute to our 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms of understanding of scientific 
knowledge. 

Kertész believes that cognitivism, combined with the naturalized 
philosophy of science, has the potential to solve the problems of 
theoretical terms, the problem of the criterion of truth, and Zeno 
paradox, among others. The major limit of the traditional, analytic 
philosophy of science was its concern to JUSTIFY its object of inquiry, 
based on the principles of rationality and a priori assumptions. The 
naturalized philosophy of science, an analogue of the naturalized 
epistemology, aims to DESCRIBE and EXPLAIN scientific knowledge by using 
empirical, a posteriori evidence. While NATURALISM for Quine 
means 'behaviourism', SCIENCE is a synonym for natural sciences, and 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE should be explained in terms of behavioral 
psychology, Kertész opts for a weak version of naturalism and a less rigid 
concept of science: explanations, after all, are not all alike, and 
cognitive science has already resulted in empirically legitimate (i.e. 
testable) explanations of phenomena. 

In the second part of the book, 'Prospects: Theoretical Terms', Kertész 
tests the hypothesis that the cognitive theory of metaphor and the two-
level approach to meaning can solve the problem of theoretical terms 
(Chapter 3). The author asks 'what the case would be' (p. 65) if the two 
metascientific extensions of cognitive semantics, the cognitive theory of 
metaphor (Chapter 4) and the two-level approach to meaning (Chapter 5), 
were involved in solving the problem of theoretical terms, which are 
introduced to build theories, explain observable facts, and provide 
understanding of phenomena. However, theoretical terms are only 
hypothetical constructs, which do not refer to 'observable reality'. Yet, 
it is precisely the theoretical terms that, via the method of explication, 
establish the relationship between a theory and that reality. The early 
logical empiricism, which was focused on the semantic (referential) aspect 
of theoretical terms, failed to capture the dichotomy. A more plausible 
approach, Kertész suggests, would perhaps attempt a pragmatic explanation, 
focusing on the context-dependency of theoretical terms, with a specific 
scientific theory functioning as a context. 

Following the current trend to reconstruct the problem of theoretical 
terms 'as an essentially linguistic issue' (p. 57), Kertész analyzes the 
terms of the Standard Theory (ST) and the Government and Binding Theory 
(GB). The author conducts the analysis in three steps: first he analyzes 
the structure of theoretical terms, then the structure of scientific 
explanations, and finally the relationship between theoretical terms and 
the context (pragmatics). According to the holistic approach, the 
theoretical terms such as for example 'tree', 'node', 'cycle', 
or 'daughter', are part of metaphorical expressions, which in turn are 
based on metaphorical concepts. The explanations are structured in such a 
way that the explication process focuses on the relation holding between 
the theoretical term and the underlying metaphorical concept. Finally, the 
pragmatic aspects of theoretical terms are already part of metaphorical 
concepts and scenarios in which they are employed. 

On the other side, the modular approach postulates that the interpretation 
of a lexical item (or a theoretical term) in a certain context is the 
mapping of its semantic representation onto the level of its conceptual 
structure (hence the name 'two-level approach'). The relationship between 
the conceptual and the semantic representations entails that theoretical 
terms, like other lexical items, are semantically underdetermined. 
However, several conceptual principles regulate interpretation of a 
lexical item in a certain context (the principle of conceptual shift, 
conceptual specification and conceptual selection), enabling a correct 
mapping of semantic representations onto the conceptual representations 
required by the context. Thus, unlike the traditional analytic philosophy, 
which is interested in the relationship between the EXPLICANS and 
EXPLICANDUM, the cognitive science of science focuses on the CONCEPTUAL 
aspects of theoretical terms. 

Part III of the book, 'Prospects: Sociological Extensions', explores some 
elements of the sociological perspective on scientific knowledge (Chapter 
7), proposing sociological extensions of the modular (Chapter 8) and the 
holistic approach (Chapter 9), and testing whether the two extensions can 
capture the interactions between the conceptual and social factors that 
shape scientific knowledge. The sociological extension of the modular 
approach is a case study aiming to show that 'theoretical contents' of ST 
and GB are based on interaction of the conceptual and the motivational 
modules. These modules, the argument goes, have universal principles and 
parameters. 

For example, a universal principle of the conceptual module is the 
relevance principle, adapted from Sperber and Wilson's relevance theory, 
stating: "Every explanation is put forward in a context ct under the 
assumption of its maximal relevance with respect to ct." While this 
principle, among many other pragmatic principles, can easily be applied to 
scientific theories, that is not the case with the universal principle of 
the so-called motivational module, which is probably 'the weakest link' of 
the sociological extension. It states that the social interests select 'I-
properties' of scientific theories. In other words, the social interests 
determine which conceptual properties of an object will become elements of 
its conceptual representation. As an example, Kertész comments on the 
social interests that governed the development of ST and GB, i.e. 
systematic description and systematic restriction of grammar, 
respectively. These social interests are reflected in the motivational 
principles underlying the two theories (the principle of systematicity / 
simplicity and the principle of restrictiveness), with the motivational 
element functioning as a part of the conceptual structures in these 
theories.

The sociological extension of the holistic approach is a case study about 
the relationship between the conceptual and social factors in the theories 
of AIDS, emphasizing the role of conversational analysis in these theories 
and suggesting that metascientific reflexion of the cognitive theory of 
metaphor could contribute to object-scientific research (e.g. conscious 
use of metaphors). 

Chapter 10 is an attempt to justify the application of the two cognitive 
semantic theories to scientific knowledge with regard to the following: 
double-facedness of scientific knowledge, its uniqueness, the explication 
of the term 'theory', the self-application and the pragmatics of 
scientific discourse. In brief, unlike the analytic philosophy of science, 
which cannot explain the relationship between these universal principles 
and the principles of specific scientific theories, Kertész claims that 
the two-level approach explains this relationship in terms of modularity, 
and the cognitive theory of metaphor does that in terms of conceptual 
structure. Unlike the analytic philosophy of science, which assumes that 
scientific knowledge is unique, both cognitive semantic theories integrate 
this knowledge into a 'wider context of human behavior' (p. 135, 139). 
Further, the author claims, the two theories offer a new approach to the 
term 'theory' by considering scientific theory as a set of representations 
(modularism) and a conceptual framework within which different conceptual 
domains interact (holism). Finally, both approaches are self-applicable 
(p. 136, 141) and both approaches are compatible with the idea that 
scientific research / knowledge should include not only logical, 
syntactic, semantic, but also 'communicative, textual and social factors' 
(137). 

Part IV of the book, 'Limits', explains why the two cognitive semantic 
theories fall short of their goal when applied to scientific knowledge. By 
addressing the problem of normativity of metascientific reflexion, as well 
as drawbacks of plausible reasoning and fallacies in the two approaches 
(Chapter 11), circularity in them (Chapter 12), and their inability to 
solve, without first empirically reformulating, problems such as the 
criterion of truth or Zeno's paradox (Chapter 13), Kertész concludes the 
book with an emphasis on the limits of the two cognitive semantic theories 
(Chapter 14), pointing out to further questions for the cognitive science 
of science (Chapter 15). 

DISCUSSION

The idea of widening the scope both of the naturalized philosophy of 
science and of cognitive semantics deserves credit. However, Kertész shows 
that this goal cannot be achieved by accepting the main hypotheses of the 
book. The hypotheses are not only overgeneralized, as pointed by the 
author, they are also inconsistent at several levels. For example, it is 
not always clear whether Kertész talks about Fodorian or Chomskian or the 
modularity of the two-level approach, although they differ in important 
ways. Also, throughout the book Kertész develops case studies as thought 
experiments, with terminology used in pre-explicative sense. If we recall 
that the basic concepts of the theories whose methodology the author 
adopts in search for the cognitive science of science also lack precise 
definitions (e.g. concept, conceptual domain, metaphorical representation, 
etc.), then it becomes clear that the naturalized philosophy of science 
based on the two semantic theories lacks the potential to coherently and 
consistently EXPLAIN phenomena, evolving into a better alternative to the 
analytic philosophy of science. 

This informationally dense book requires a patient reader. Chapters are 
structured around the main hypotheses and research questions, but the book 
also provides ample background information, sometimes incorporated into 
the text, but more often presented as notes and quotations. Those who 
write about interdisciplinary topics know how difficult it is to 
appropriately incorporate background information and will perhaps tolerate 
text's fragmentation. Other readers may feel occasionally frustrated by a 
half-page or longer quotations that very often are not necessary. 

Finally, Kertész's stand on the concept of cognitive architecture is not 
clear. This is problematic, given that explanations of the relationship 
between the scientific knowledge and knowledge of language should stem 
from the conception of the functional architecture within which the two 
entities relate in a clear way. Kertész's proposal stems from relating 
these two entities methodologically, not theoretically per se. 
Methodological choices can affect theory in unwanted ways. In this case, 
application of linguistics methodology to scientific knowledge has 
theoretical consequences: an incorrect assumption that the two types of 
knowledge belong to the same type of knowledge. However, that is not the 
case. Note that LANGUAGE, the object of linguistics and semantics, can be 
studied as either KNOWLEDGE of language (competence) or as USE of that 
knowledge (performance). Scientific knowledge, on the other hand, is 
always explicit. By choosing to apply the methods of two cognitive 
semantic theories to scientific knowledge, Kertész dismisses the 
distinction between the tacit or implicit knowledge, such as knowledge of 
language, and explicit knowledge, such as scientific knowledge. 

Also, there is growing neuropsychological evidence indicating that the two 
types of knowledge employ different cognitive resources. While 
deterioration of episodic memory is one of the first symptoms of 
Alzheimer's dementia, followed by gradual deterioration of semantic 
knowledge, semantic dementia wipes out a person's semantic knowledge (i.e. 
knowledge about the world and the mental lexicon), leaving out only those 
aspects that are tightly related to everyday experience. On the other 
side, aphasic syndromes affect language in different ways, without in 
principle affecting either episodic or semantic memory. 

Thus, knowledge of language and scientific knowledge are parallel neither 
methodologically nor theoretically. Why, then, use the methods of 
linguistics to explain the nature of scientific knowledge? While it is 
certainly interesting to follow the author's reasoning on 'what the case 
would be' if one applied modularism of a certain type or semantic holism 
in analysis of scientific knowledge, the book could have benefited from a 
clearer picture on the author's understanding of the relationship between 
language and scientific knowledge.
 
This brings out the main objection to this book. It pertains to the 
author's assumption that since linguistics is a contributing discipline of 
cognitive science, and cognitive semantics is part of linguistics, 
cognitive semantics is also part of cognitive science. Based on this 
assumption Kertész proposes employing the methods of cognitive semantics 
in analysis of scientific knowledge (object of philosophy of science, 
which is also 'part' of cognitive science). This reflects the so 
called 'weak', 'less ambitious' concept of cognitive science (Gardner 
1985) according to which cognitive science is just a 'collaboration' among 
the following disciplines: neuroscience, psychology, linguistics, 
artificial intelligence and philosophy. Although this concept is present 
in most dictionaries and textbooks on cognitive science, it does not 
correctly reflect the state of affairs. Cognitive science is a scientific 
paradigm (Kuhn 1962), based on specific theoretical and methodological 
assumptions (Von Eckardt 1995, Encyclopaedia of Cognitive Science 2003), 
which guide research towards coherent and consistent explanations of 
phenomena. In other words, cognitive science is not the sum of the five 
disciplines, but rather their crossing point. This means that, contrary to 
the 'weak' view, not all the content of the contributing disciplines 
necessarily constitutes cognitive science. 

Does it mean, then, that it is too early to talk about the cognitive 
science of science? The answer to this question is perhaps in the 'strong' 
version of cognitive science as a basis for the naturalized philosophy of 
science. That means acceptance of cognitive science as a new paradigm, 
which is emerging from the crossing of the five disciplines. In other 
words, instead of 'borrowing' the methods from the contributing sub-
disciplines of cognitive science, the cognitive science of science would 
explain the underlying mechanisms of scientific knowledge by a theory that 
could consistently explain conceptualization at all levels, starting from 
the word-level and text, and capturing the mapping processes between the 
levels (conceptual vs. semantic), across the domains (source vs. target), 
and between the elements of cognition (perception vs. conception 
interactivity). Developing such a theory, which could be done within the 
context of Jackendoff's representational modularity, would perhaps bail 
out the idea of cognitive science of science. 

REFERENCES

Bierwisch, M. "How Much Space Gets into Language?" Ms.

Bierwisch, M. & Schreuder, R. 1992. From Concepts to Lexical 
Items. "Cognition" 42, pp. 23-60.

"Encyclopaedia of Cognitive Science". 2003. Edited by Lynn Nadel. London, 
England: Nature Pub. Group. 

Gardner, H. 1985. "The Mind's New Science". New York: Basic Books. 

Kuhn, T. 1970. "The Structure of Scientific Theories". Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.

Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. 1980. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press.

Von Eckardt, B. 1995. "What Is Cognitive Science?" Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press. 

ABOUT THE REVIEWER

Vanja Kljajevic received her doctorate in Cognitive Science from Carleton 
University, Ottawa. Her research interests include language disorders, 
processing of complex syntax, syntactic working memory, and philosophy of 
psychology. She is currently involved in projects related to human-
computer interaction and verbal communication of emotions.





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